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                       Policy makers are interested in regulating the position of monopolistic enterprises because 
the conduct of such enterprises could have appreciable impact on the market. Besides having bad 
economical consequences, a concentration of economical power could also create political 
influence and affect all  aspects of society. Corporations with monopolistic position on the 
market can behave independently from other competitors, create unequal conditions and 
discriminate against other customers . The legal system responds to social forces, which try to 
protect themselves from economical and political domination.1 The legal structure also has its 
reverse effect on the society. It influences thought and behavior and it regulates the relationship 
between participants. In these cases participants are subjects on the market, i.e. enterprises.     
                       Antimonopoly legislation affects corporations with large market shares and with large 
profits .Theirs marketing policies, business planning and practices which they use to survive on 
the market depend on the law in each particular country. Consequently, law is an important part 
of political-legal environment that affects business. Aims that are supposed to be achieved by 
such legislation are : protection of small business, of consumers and of society. Antimonopoly 
statutes are tailored to fit the specific goals to be achieved, such as efficiency, employment and 
the preservation of a single market2 . 
                       Some other countries have more stringent rules then the U.S. and EC. In India, for 
example, corporations producing food need special permission to lance trade mark that is 
duplicating already existing products.3 In Filippines somebody who produces an expensive kind 
of food ,  must also make a cheaper version of it.  
                     Former socialistic countries have passed legislation that regulates monopolistic position 
and exclusionary conduct4. This kind of regulation is necessary , because the competition is an 
 
1For example : In US. Public demand for regulation of monopoly was so loud especially in 1870 , legal response was 
Sherman act passed in 1890. 
2To avoid creation of barriers to entry which could isolate local markets and create different conditions for business. 
3For example Coca-Cola  and it's Indian producer 
4For example Hungary: Act lxxxvi of 1990 on the prohibitions of unfair market practices ,Hungarian rules of law in force 
1991. 
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important element in market economy. Some authors argue against such legislation because 
according to their opinion it punishes the winners. It affects business incentive,vigor and 
initiative. They defend big business, because it can invest more in research and development and 
offer better advantages for planning.5 R.A. Posner thinks that there is no need for monopoly 
regulation and argues that the market can control big business instead with smaller costs.6 Even 
A. Smith realized that monopoly elements are consisted in laisser faire7, but he believed that 
government should not interfere because regulation could do more harm than good. 
                      There are also other objections pointed against passing antimonopoly law from pragmatic 
point of view. Usually marketing personnel are against such statutes because the statute limits 
their possibilities, e.g. they must change their mind about introduction of new products on the 
market . They also point out that people in administrative agencies lack practical sense for 
business. They wonder what is the main purpose to be achieved, when enforcement costs are 
bigger then advantages gained with the enacted law. Considering all arguments against 
regulation of monopolies , the fact is that all Western Countries with market type of economy , 








2. AIMS AND METHODS OF THE STUDY 
                     
 
5 GALBRAITH is one of the authors  who is against any kind of control over monopoly. 
6Posner R. Antitrust law ,1976 
7laissez fair 
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                    Former socialistic countries in the past did not recognize the importance of competition 
and the free market. In theory, a free market allows everyone to choose what to produce , to 
whom to sell, and what prices to charge.8 It is interesting first to analyze how the U.S. and the 
EC through their antimonopoly statutes balanced the situation on their markets.This paper will 
consider their legal solutions , as well as the enforcement agencies and procedures that enable 
application of the relevant statutes.In addition, differences and similarities between those two 
legal solutions will also be examined. 
                       Futher on, I will analyze the market situation in Macedonian , and the laws that exist to 
suppress monopoly conduct. I will try to answer the questions : Whether Macedonia needs such a 
law, whether the present law is a good law, and possible improvements in the regulatory 
framework in Macedonia.  
                      In addition to the comparative method ,the normative method will also be used with 
purpose not to find what the law is but what is the standard9 for monopolistic enterprise on the 
market which is under constant change. Also, I will employ textual and historical methods of 
analysis to the statutes and articles , together with graphical method, in order to simplify certain 
points. 
            In connection with my analyses of the current situation in Macedonia, I will use micro and 
statistical analyses. I must mention the difficulty that exists in assessment of relevant statistical 
data. I was not able to find information for the biggest firms on the Macedonian market., because 
there are no periodicals dealing with this. It is hard especially now after we became an 
independent country. There are no informations identifying the biggest companies in trade , their 
annual sales, number of employed persons, or their profits. Firms would not give me this data 
 
8Although truly unregulated market never existed but "...interplay and continuing  interaction between the regulation the 
market by external forces  including government  and the discipline and the regulation of the market itself..." , The 
government and the economy, G. Stigler ;23 page 
9Zelenkov B, Ekonomska politicka na Yu, 1989 
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because they regard them as confidential. I present here the only data that I could find 
concerning this matter. 
                       This study will be concerned only with a single firm monopolization and the term 
monopoly will only refer to a single firm monopolization on the relevant area and not to 




3. THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM "MONOPOLY" AND  
ITS DEFINITION 
                     
                       The origin of the term "monopoly" comes from two old Greeks words: Mono which 
means one and Polist that means seller.10 As a theoretical model it refers to a market structure 
with only one supplier many buyers and no competition. 
                       In the MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics 11 it is defined as a market with only one 
seller of homogenous product , without available substitutes for it on the market , and lots of 
customers. 
                       Monopoly may alternativly be defined as ownership of the source or a commodity and 
domination in its distribution.12 Another definition , found in the Encyclopedia of Economics, 13 
treats monopoly as a theoretical market structure, in which there is only one supplier who 
controls quantity produced and offered for sale and its price. Under this definition, market entry 
must be closed for other competitors. 
 
10 Samuelson & Nordhaus:, Economics,1985 
11Pearce D. , 1992 
12Rosenberg J. ,Dictionary of business  and management, 1978 
13Greenwald D.,1982 
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                       I must underline differences that exist in understanding of term "monopoly" in eastern and  
western countries. From the Marxist perspective "monopoly" also embraces all contracts and 
kinds of conspiracy among monopolistic enterprises.14 For Marxizians even one period from the 
development of the society is called "monopoly Capitalism".  
            On the other hand in U.S. the term "antimonopoly legislation" is an expression which covers15 







ess relating to monopoly and competition  that originated from late 19 th century. 
                      In this study the term "monopoly" refers to a single firm which has power over the market 
for special kind of product that enables it to control prices , quantity or sale conditions. It does 
not refer to contracts between big corporations or concerted practices, but only to one firm which 
tries to obtain unfair advantages by using its dominant position on the market. So, this term is not 
exclusively connected with pure monopolistic situation on the market. It refers to any enterprise 







14Ruskov T., Politicka ekonomija,1982 
15GoyderD.G.; EC competition law,1993 
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                       The first theory of monopolistic competition was introduced in 1933 by E.H. Chemberlen 
16and Robinson17This theory introduces a market with a large number of firms producing similar 
but not identical products. The product differentiation and absence of freedom of entry enables 
enterprises to earn a monopoly profit. They can behave as superior companies because their 
products are similar but not interchangeable from customers' point of view. 
                       Economic theory of monopoly is the basis for antimonopoly regulation in the U.S. It is 
mostly supported by Chicago law school and R. Posner. In his book Antitrust Law, he defines a 
monopolist as "a seller who can charge higher prices by limiting his output". The 
            monopolist will stop raising its price at the point at which any other increase would reduce its 
revenue more then reduction in total cost, which would result from the smaller quantity 
produced. This could only be possible in monopolistic market structure with no other producers , 
without new entrants, and with inelastic demand curve. 
                       Monopolies produce social costs and losses. Buyers are forced to use substitutes which 
are more costly to produce. If they had been cheaper customers would have used them earlier. 
Consumer demand thus is satisfied , but at higher cost. Thus resources are not being allocated in 
the most efficient way.  
                       While in the U.S, the theorists are mostly concerned with the fact that deadweight 
produced by monopoly will not be captured by anyone , the EC scientists are more concerned 
with isolation of the member states markets. In the background of the EC legislation the theory is 
that dominant undertakings controlling 45% or more of the local markets would be counter-
productive for the economical integration of the European Union .In a monopolist market, there 
is a single supplier who is able to charge higher prices, by controlling its output. Consumers have 
no other choice , but to buy from the monopolist. Monopolist profits will induce a company to 
use unlawful devices to maintain its dominant position, which will create obstacles among 
 
16The theory of monopolistic competition ,1933  
17The economics of imperfect competition 
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member states markets. This is contrary to the goals of the EC Treaty , which prohibits "abuse" 
of the dominant position. This explanation is the basis for article 86 of Treaty of Rome. 
                       U.S. and EC in their prevention of monopolistic behavior on the market have two 
different directions. While the U.S.theory is mostly based on economical analysis , the EC is 
more concerned with creation of a single market without any impediment from its subjects. It is 
less based on the cost and benefit analysis and the deadweight produced by the dominant 
company. 
                      According to the marxistic theory, monopolization of the market was considered to be the 
beginning of the end of the capitalistic society, because it enables accumulation of wealth and 
political power in the hands of a few and poverty for the rest of the people. Lenin18 wrote that the 
phenomenon of market concentration makes the monopoly the most fundamental characteristic 
of capitalism. His opinion is expressed within the following sentence: 
            " Monopoly with its high prices and without technical development gives birth to rotting...". 
      Yet, I must mention that socialistic countries in their economical theory recognized that 
monopoly has had bad consequences for the whole society, especially because its position 
enables the monopolists to earn extra profit. This is contrary to the marxists idea for equal 
distribution of the wealth among people. The only basis for distribution should be hard work and 
skills. But in practice it  was a lawful device for economic planing . It was accepted as part of the 
system and was established by law. The socialists tried to fix the production according to 
people's needs. This was not done very successfully, as one factory was usually producing one 
product and there was no competition . These factories were de facto monopolies on the market. 
The situation resulted in lack of products on the market and permanent economical crises. There 
is a difference between theory and practice, so it looks as Lenin is misrepresented. Or perhaps, 
the interpretation of his opinion over this matter is correct, but not quite implemented in practice.   
 
 




5. NATURAL AND STATE MONOPOLIES 
             
                       Sometimes there is benefit of having a single firm organize the production. This depends 
on economy of scale, when only one firm can survive on the market.19 Monopoly which 
existence is justified because of the economical reasons is called natural monopoly. These so 
called natural monopolies are the most efficient way to organize the production because of huge 
capital requirements for plant and equipment. They are mostly found in public utilities sectors. 
Anyway, there are problems caused by natural monopolies. For example imposition of excessive 
prices or restriction of the output. Natural monopolies can increase their costs through 
overpaying for supply or through paying excessive wages.20 Because of absence of constraints 
from competition, natural monopolies are usually controlled by some kind of commission or 
governmental body. In U.S., the standard policy for such industries is to establish regulatory 
commissions , to control prices and quality of services.  
                      In Europe, however, monopoly position for such enterprises is ussualy granted by statute. 
In the case where such position is granted by state this kind of monopolies are called state 
monopolies. Because of its possible effect on the single market, the Treaty on European Union 
has provisions governing state monopolies : articles 37 & 90.21  
                      In Macedonia the relevant statute governing state monopolies is Company Act from 1988 
year and its amendment from 1990. The 1988 Company Act regulates public utilities such as 
transport, electricity and communications.22These articles were changed by an amendment from 
 
19Samuelson; Nordhous, Economics,1985 
20For e.g ,in U.S. in electric power industry there was a network of local monopolies in private hands but under governament 
    regulation. Reason for considering these monopolisare character of services and inelasticy of demand curve. As a kind of  
    experiment, competition was provide by Tennesse Valley Authority. The.effect of this was a lowering of the rates to be  
    payed. (8 Readings inm Economics , P.A. Samuelson , 1970 - W. Adams )                 
21 more in the part for E.C 
22 Macedonian Company act,1988,20-24 
Commented [BP1]: Page: 12 
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199023 By this Act state monoplies are defined as particular kind of enterprises created from the 
state for the purpose of satisfying public demand in public interest areas. The 1990 amandment 
of this Act allows, for the first time, natural and civil persons to own or invest money in state 
monopolies. Conditions for their operation are laid down by local governments. Republic 
administrative body, on the other hand, controls every price raise. 
                       I share the general opinion that it is not always useful to suppress the monopoly. There are 
special cases when there is no better way to organize the production than to allow a 
monopolization of that particular market. All countries have special legal regime to regulate state 
monopolies. Therefore, they recognized that sometimes the existence of monopoly is justified by 




            6. METHODS THAT CAN BE USED TO REGULATE  
            MONOPOLISTIC POSITION ON THE MARKET 
 
                       The fear of monopolistic exploitation induces governments to use different methods of 
control. For example; they often use excessive taxes to reduce monopoly profit. This is a good 
method to reduce their extra earnings, but not sufficiently effective to increase supply. 
                       Another method used to capture monopoly profit is price control. This is the usual method 
used to determine the prices in former socialistic countries. In U.S. this method was also 
introduced in 1970 by president Nixon, but it resulted in shortages of gasoline, toilet paper etc. 
This shows that it was not a very effective method. 
                       In Europe, governmental ownership is the most commonly used method to control 
monopoly. It is more efficient than the previous ones , and it has been used for quite a long time. 
 
23Macedonian Company act;articals 24a-24b 
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It has been modified , but never replaced. It is used during the history to control public utilities 
such as : telephone, electricity, railroads.etc... 
            Other forms of enforcing public policy are: 
            1) Regulatory commissions such as those originally created to cope with natural monopolies. 
            This method constitutes governmental control without ownership. Besides control of the prices, 
the governament controls output, entry to and exit from the market. Regulatory commissions are 
created to control public utilities and financial markets. Sometimes industries even welcome 
control , because it means immunity from prosecution by the antitrust division.  
            2) Antitrust legislation.  
            Statutes and Regulations help to preserve competition and induce selfregulation of the market 
without direct governmental involvement. 
                       The main focus of the remainder of this paper will be on antitrust legislation. Throughout 
my study, I will be dealing only with the method, antitrust legislation as one of the methods 
which are used to control monopolies. 
 
 
            
7. REGULATION OF MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
      7.1.Origins and rationale 
 
                       Origins and rationale for legislation regulating monopolistic behavior are to be found in 
the history and development of American society and its market economy. As trade opportunities 
grew , the market became more and more dominated by large corporations. During 1880 , 
concentration was going on in major areas of industry, which were mainly controlled through the 
device of trust. Big business managers realized that it was much better for them to contact and to 
create some kinds of unions, to work together instead of competing. Some corporations were also 
16 
able to drive other competitors out of the market and then they grew stronger and bigger. 
Accumulation of the capital enabled creation of big companies which were able to control the 
market. Corporations were also aware that they would be better off , if they agreed between them 
on the selling terms , the price and quantity produced. 
                      Besides economical reasons for suppression of monopolies, the public was also afraid that 
accumulation of economic power could affect political life and individual freedom.. 
            "If concentrated power is tolerated, giant pressure groups will ultimately gain control and 
democracy will be suppressed by some form of authoritantism." 
                       Small businessmen wanted to protect their competitive position and they demanded 
protective legislation. Another function that antitrust law was originally supposed to perform was 
to protect the unity of American country and their single market. However this function is no 
longer of much practical importance, since the unity of the market is well established. A 
campaign with the parole "Distrust in trust, trust in competition"24 resulted in the passage in 1890 
of the federal Sherman Act. 
                       Sherman Act prohibits any conduct which attempts to create monopoly, conspiracy to 
monopolize and actual monopolization This act also provides for judicial review and proscribes 
organs that are in charge to facilitate proceedings ( section 4) . Subjects of this law and the 
meaning of the word person are also specified in section 8 .The main goals to be achieved with 
this statute were to preserve freedom of enterprise and to force corporations to internalize their 
costs of production.   
            After the Sherman Act, a number of other acts were enacted to regulate various aspects of 
competition: 
 
24Speech of one of the senators in campaigne which was going on in 1877, SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE, N.Y. 
Columbia University Press, 1980  
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1. Clayton Act (1914): prohibits discriminatory pricing , tying arraignments, exclusive dealing. 
Agriculture, labor and horticultural organizations are exempted from its application. It 
amends Sherman act and is more specific. It provides penalties for monopolization. 
2. Robinson-Patman Act (1936): outlaws discriminatory pricing. 
3. Miller-Tidings act (1937): exempts vertical price fixing from federal antitrust law in states 
which have fair-trade laws. 
            4.   Anti-merger Act (1950): amends the Clayton Act and broadens the prohibition against 
mergers which would restrain trade.  
            5.   Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) : establishes federal commission and prohibits unfair 
and deceptive practices injurious to competition. It is important for enforcement of relevant 
statutes in monopoly cases.    
6. Revenue act (1916). 
7. Webb-Pomerene Export Trade act (1918). 
8. State fair trade laws (1931). 
            All of the foregoing form the body of U.S. antitrust law. Some of these laws contain 
antimonopoly provisions. All of them were passed by congress, which makes them federal laws, 
regulating different markets' behaviors. 
                       Besides the enumerated Acts, the States have statutes of their own. The congress allows 
state's laws to differ from one another. This does not create a problem, since, for all practical 
purposes, competition regulation is of federal concern. From the prospective of monopoly 
regulation it is interesting to mention that more from half of the states prohibits predatory pricing 
, primarily to protect the margin of profits of small businesses. The reason for this is small 
business'  bigger importance in smaller (local) areas.25 Most of the states usually outlaw price 
 
25Senator Benton, 1950,"...small business represents the leadership and initiative which have helped this country  survive the 
winters of depression and war...small business was THE CORE  OF COMMUNITY LIFE..." 
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discrimination , price fixing, division of the market and other devices that might restrain trade. 
This is why antitrust Acts are often called restrain of trade laws. 
 
      7.2. Enforcement of antimonopoly legislation 
 
                       There is a dual enforcement of federal antitrust law in the Member states courts and also 
in the Federal Courts. Organs in charge for administering antimonopoly statutes are the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Division of Justice Department and the State Attorney General.  
                       The FTC was established in 1914 by Federal Trade Commission Act. The Act enables the 
Commission to act as enforcement agency and to take actions against pricing violations under 
Sherman act26. This Commission is also responsible for administering Webb-Pomerene Act, 
Consumers Credit Protection Act27, Clayton Act and for series of other Acts that regulate 
labeling of certain products. It is consisted of 5 commissioners appointed by the president. The 
FTC is very important administrative organ that acts as an investigator agency , prosecutor and 
judge. The Commission also helps industry better to understand relevant laws through issuance 
of Trade Practice Rules and through organizing Conferences. The Federal Trade Commission 
issues industry guides that deal with activities within its jurisdiction. The Commission also 
makes an extensive use of the Consent decrees which specifies which steps should be taken by 
the defendant to stop the alleged violation. The FTC's powers are to file complaints , to issue 
cease and desest orders and to impose penalties up to 5,000$. Appeals from the Commission's 
decisions are available in Federal Courts.  
                       Other administrative organ is Antitrust division of the Justice Department in charge for 
civil and especially for criminal proceedings under Sherman Antitrust Act. Its powers are mostly 
to punish and not to prevent like FTC. DOJ can issue guidlines, can provide a business -review 
 
26Authorised by Section 5 of the FTC Act 
27When such an enforcement is not administered by particular agency 
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procedure and can give prior clearance. Antitrust division has authority to impose "three D's" - 
divestiture, divorcement and dissolution. Because of its extensive powers defendants would 
rather sign a consent decree or apply a plea of nolo contendere to the Court. 
                       The third administrative organ is State Attorney General which is empowered by Sherman 
Act, section 4 , by Clayton Act , section 15 and by Antitrust Improvement Act to institute 
proceedings against violators of antimonopoly law , under direction of Attorney General. 
According to Clayton Act , section 4C , any Attorney General of a State can commence a civil 
action for money relief on the behalf on natural persons residing in the very State. On the other 
hand , this right has been extended by Hart-Scott- Rodono Antitrust Improvement Act from 1976 
which empowered the state A.G., to bring a treble damages action on behalf of its citizens, 
parens patriae treble damage action. State Attorney General also , may induce the FTC to initiate 
antimonopoly proceedings.  
                       Besides public action, individuals also have the right to commence an antimonopoly 
procedure under the Clayton Act , section 4. Threefold damages are good incentive for private 
parties to bring antitrust claims in District Courts. Private plaintiffs are also empowered to sue 
for injunctive relief , under Clayton Act , section 16. The judicial test for permissible plaintiff is 
the Direct Injury Test.28 Under this test only direct purchasers can claim damages in 
antimonopoly competition cases . Persons who suffered direct injury from the monopolistic 
behavior can claim the entire sum , even in cases where overcharge was passed down the 
distribution chain. 29 
            The second test, for the permissible private plaintiff was laid down by the Court in the 
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loews30case. It is known as the Target Area Test and its starting 
 
28Loeb v. Eastmen Kodak Co. 183 F. 704, 709 (3rd Cir. 1910 ) 
29Indirect purchasers are not entitled to seek private relief except if they show that the entire overcharge was passed onto 
him. This exception was formulated in the Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois case and it is known as a Brick rule. This rule 
says that undercut buyer can seek relief only if there was a pre-contract, both as to mark up and quantity and if the 
middleman was involved as the part of the antitrust conspiracy. But , in such a case the only available remedy is 
injunction. This exception is not available in cases of a single firm monopolization. 
30 193 f. 2d (9th  Cir 1951). 
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point is who should be protected. The favored plaintiffs are the customers and the competitors , 
who usually suffer the biggest damage because of the monopolistic behavior on the market. 
                       Sherman Act section 4 and Clayton Act , section 11 (c) and 4 (h) vested the jurisdiction of 
antimonopoly cases to District Federal Courts. The verdict of these appellate courts can be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court , who can order rehearing , deny the petition of certiory or affirm 
the District Court judgment. 
                       Administrative agencies are passing their decisions according to administrative procedure. 
The Federal Trade Commission issues and files complaint , stating its charges to the person in 
violation of the Act and to Attorney General.31 After hearing and investigating the facts , in the 
case where the FTC finds that the corporation is in violation of Antitrust law , the Commission 
makes a report and issues an order to cease and desist a wrongful doing. Then the defendant has 
a right to file a petition in the Court of Appeals of the United States. Antitrust division is 
exclusively in charge to act as enforcement agency for criminal penalties. The defendant can be 
put in prison only in the criminal proceeding. 
                       Damages can be awarded in the legal civil procedure. In antitrust damage cases, parties 
have the right their case to be heard by the jury . Jurors act as fact finders of the liability and 
amount of damage awarded. In the cases of private injunction , there is no right the case to be 
heared by a jury. Therefore, the fact finder's role is performed by the District Judge.  
 
      7.3. Remedies 
         
                      There are various public remedies. For example: FTC can issue cease and desist orders . 
Criminal penalties such as imprisonment up to three years and fines are sometimes suitable 
punishment for monopoly offenses. In a single firm monopolization case , there can also be 
changes in firm's structure-division to smaller firms. Antitrust division is the one which has the 
 
31Clayton Act , section 11. 
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power to impose divorcement or mandatory orders for dissolution. The courts , on the request of 
the administrative enforcement agencies can issue temporary injunction or cease and desist 
orders. The last three are equitable remedies. In addition to these , private plaintiffs can obtain 
damages. They are entitled by the Clayton Act to get treble sum of damage suffered. Substantial 
Judicial latitude is given to plaintiffs in calculating and proving damages. In cases of 
monopolization the principle basis for calculation is the difference between the actual paid prices 
and the price that they would have to pay in a competitive market. The District Court excepted 
that: 
            " The amount of damages should not equal the entire difference between the monopoly 
price and competition price , but rather the price increase caused by the anti competitive 
conduct that originated or augmented the monopolist's control over the market."32. 
            Today , most judges and antitrust analists working on antimonopoly cases, consider these 
remedies to be too harsh. They have concluded that threefold damages , are very high and they 
do not just compensate the plaintiff , but that they also have the overdetterance effect. Judges 
have a second thought to order mandatory dissolution of the corporation in violation of Sherman 
Act , section 2 , because they do not want to interfere with firm's business. Now , there is a 
tendency toward lowering the antimonopoly remedies.  
 
      7.4.Analysis of Sherman act , section 2  
 
            "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize , or combine or conspire 
with any other person to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several states or with foreign nationals shall be deemed guilty of felony." 
            In this section three different offenses are proscribed. First, it is the case of actual 
monopolization. This violation arises when corporation with large market share, over 90 %, uses 
 
32Berkey Photo, Inc v. Eastmen Kodak Co.,603 F (2d Cir 1979) cert. denied, 444U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct.1061, 1981;297 
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its power to create barriers to entry. It condemns a-single firm monopolization of the market. The 
general intent to use that power is presumed on the persons conduct.   
                      This act also covers preliminary steps. An attempt to monopolize should be understood as 
a separate offense in a case where the evidence shows smaller amounts of market power. This 
section catches both cases , where there is an already existing monopoly and where a corporation 
with a smaller market share uses its power to drive the competitors out from the market. In the 
second case , Court's standards are much stricter . A plaintiff needs to show a specific intent and 
the conduct requirement is much stricter. The third offense is a joint abuse by two or more 
enterprises in order to monopolize the market. This is the federal law and can be applied only 
when there is a "direct effect on interstate trade'', but it also refers to manufacturing, too. The last 
part provides fines and imprisonment for the violators of this section.  
            The origin of this prohibition is in the common law doctrine which says : 
            "A private trader can freely exercise his own independent discretion , in respect of the 
party with whom he deals , but only in absence of any purpose of creating or maintaining 
monopoly."33. 
            Monopoly position is not itself condemned , but rather the conduct that enables maintenance of 
monopoly position.34 Corporations can have market power over 90 % of the market and still not 
be convicted under Sherman Act , section 2. On the contrary, even with smaller market power , 
they could be accused for monopolization if they practice unfair conducts. They are such acts 
that give a person the power to control prices or to exclude his competitors.   
                       Sherman Act , section 2 has been accused of being too vague and unclear. For example it 
does not define the meaning of trade35, when a firm has a monopoly position on the market, nor 
whether that is sufficient to be condemned.Most of these answers to these questions can be found 
 
33Kamp H. H. , ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW ; 1985 
34This paper will not analyze attempts to monopolize,but instead concentrate on conduct of firms which alrady have a 
monopoly position on the market. 
35In the past  it was unclear whether commerce also means trade.  
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in judicial interpretations of the statute , according to special circumstances of the case. There is 
no rule of per se illegality in this kind of case.  
                       Analysis of monopolycases rests usually on the economic concept of market power. 
 
      7.5.Market power 
 
                       Market power is a term that is used interchangeably with monopoly power. It is defined as 
the ability to raise the price by restriction of the output. It is power that enables dominant firms 
to control prices or to exclude competitors from the market. The main issue is whether the 
company has the power to charge more than the competitive price and hether it can do that for a 
longer period than necessary. 
                       D. F. Turner 36 wrote that when a firm can persistently behave over a substantial period of 
time in a manner which differs from the behavior that the competitive market would impose on a 
competitive firm facing similar costs and demand conditions , that is evidence of monopoly 
power. For Areeda and Turner "a substantial period of time" means at least the last five years. 
This shows that in U.S., it is not enough for a corporation to have a monopoly power, but also to 
have it for a long period of time. 
            Monopoly power is a function of the following different values: 
 
1. Market share, provides evidence of market power. 
            Only corporations with a large market share can raise their price without substantial loss of sales 
and customers. The reason for this is that their competitors are small , with small market shares 
and limited possibilities for production , so , there is no other choice for the buyers on the market 
 
36A POLICY OF ANTITRUST LAW 
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but to buy product from the dominant firm.. In U.S. law usually more than 70% market share is 
enough to show monopoly position.37 . 
         2. Elasticity of demand determines the monopolist's degree of market power.  
         It is a powerful conceptual tool that shows sensitivity of the quantity of a certain product as a 
result of change in price. The more elastic the demand curve, the less power the dominant firm 
has to charge excessive prices. If the demand curve is inelastic the monopolist can charge higher 
prices without loosing too many sales. 
            3. Elasticity of supply shows the same phenomenon from the competitor's side.  
            If a firm restricts its output , other competitors on the market might be able to satisfy market 
demand if they have excess capacity or if they could easily switch to production of the deflated 
product. Elasticity of supply thus shows the ability of the other competitors on the market to 
increase their output and satisfy market demand.38 
 
      7.6. Formulas for quantifying monopoly power. 
 
                       Various authors have developed formulas for quantifying monopoly power as a tool for 
the courts to determine whether a particular firm has monopoly power. 
            Posner has proposed this formula : EDF=EDM/S + ES(1-S), where EDF is elasticity ; EDM is 
elasticity of demand , ES is elasticity of supply from other firms in the market and S is the 
market share of the firm. 
            To quantify market power, Turner and Areeda have suggested a combination of three elements. 
If one company  for 5 or more years has 50% or more of sales annually , it has Monopolypower. 
                              
                                                     Pm = e                                                  
 
37The theory of workable competition which is very popular among economists in the western countries says that , although 
one firm might have a 1oo% market share there is still interbrand competition, between producers of different goods 
, which could put constraints on the competitors' attempts to monopolize. 
38Sometimes on the market there is an umbrella effect. If a Monopolist holding 90% of the market is charging an excessive 
prices, its competitor , who holds the other 10% may also follow suit and charge tha same. 
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                                                 Pc     e-1     
            The following formula39 expresses the ratio of the monopoly to the competitive price as a 
function of the elasticity of demand , where Pm is monopoly price and Pc is competitive price. 
 
      7.7.Judicial analyses 
      
                       In order to find a violation of the Sherman Act , section 2 judges interprate and apply 
corresponding sections of the relevant statutes. They always interprate the law , in such way that 
it can be able to answer the challanges of the new time and responde to the needs of the modern 
life.There are three approaches in the U.S. judiciary for the interpretation of monopoly as a 
unlawful device. 
            a. Prior interpretation which was made by Judge Hand in ALCOA case : 
            ".One who has acquired an overwhelming share of the market , monopolizes when he does 
business."40 Judge's Hand used strict approach, which was overruled by the Griffith case.41. Now 
a monopolist can be punished only if it is engaged in exclusionary practices . 
            b. An enterprise has monopolized in violation of Sherman act , section 2 if it has acquired or 
maintained market power with the purpose to exclude others and this conduct has resulted in an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.42 
            c. Mr. Justice Douglas43 concluded that an enterprise has monopolized in violation of section 
2 if it has the power to exclude other competitors and has exercised it. This approach is now used 
to interprate the monopoly. It shows that changes in judicial interpretation of the law over time 
are consistent with changes of fundamental ideology. For example, now the focus has moved 
from protection of competition toward protection of customers. 
 
39KAMP , ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW , 1985 
40U.S.v.United Shoe Machinery Corp. , 347 U.S. 521 
41 U.S. v. Griffith ,334 U.S.  100 
42U.S. v Columbia Steel Co.,334 U.S. ,495 , 525 (-) 
43U.S. v. Griffith ,334 U.S.  100 (-) 
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                 The courts in their analysis employ the rule of reason, which was originally formulated by 
the Supreme Court as a mean to distinguish permissible from impermissible exclusionary 
practices.44 They consider particular circumstances for each case and apply two step test. First , 
the courts determine the relevant market and the firm's market share. After finding that the 
alleged violator has a monopolistic position on the market, then the courts consider the firm's 
conduct. The test of monopoly is structural, based on the percentage share of the market. 
Consequently, the determination of the market share is a very important issue. To define the 
market share, the courts  must first set boundaries of the relevant market.   
1. Determination of the relevant market. 
Elements of the market definition are: 
a. Product market 
b. Geographic market 
c. Production dimension 
            a. In order to set market boundaries, the court first identifies the product that is alleged to be 
monopolized, the relevant geographic market and the percentage of output in it. To define the 
market the courts must first identify groups of purchasers , sellers and the smallest possible 
market. In determining product market the courts usually use the test of cross elasticity of 
demand. That is they see how the slight increase of the price induces customers to switch and 
buy a similar but cheaper product. The courts also use the test of interchangeability  They 
compare two relatively similar products and examine their physical differences and their use , to 
see whether they are considered as substitutes in the view of buyers when sold at the same price. 
Two products can also be interchangeable in the eyes of the Court , in the cases when they can be 
produced by the same production facility, although customers do not considere them as 
substitutes. Sometimes through application of the tests of interchangeability and of 
 
44KAMP , ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW , 1985 
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crosselacticity of demand the Forum of Justice, finds the existence of submarkets , as the Court 
in the Brown Shoe case45 said : 
            "In the product market well-defined submarkets may exist. ...such a submarket may be 
determined ... as a separate economic entity , according to their particular characteristics 
and uses, distinct prices , sensitivity to prices." 
            Submarkets do not have a big importance in a single monopolization case 
            b. Second issue to be determined is the geographic market. It is an area in which the defendant 
sells the product and where the buyers look for their supply. It is the place where the sellers 
compete for distribution and to which the customers may turn to an alternative kind of a product. 
It could be worldwide , nationwide or local trade where particular product is sold. Indications for 
a single market are close price relationships and sales patterns. Barriers for entry on the 
particular market are the transportation costs and customer's preferences. Transportation costs 
increase the price of the product and make it less competitive. On the other hand , buyers usually 
choose to buy a product that is near the area where they live , instead of making travel expenses 
and buying an article on sale miles away from their homes. Customer's preferences are very 
important , because clientele usually buy the same product for which they are convinced to be 
better than another similar article. They are not easily going to switch and buy a new product. 
Thus, new entrant must invest a lot of money in advertisements , which increase costs. 
            c. Production dimension is an important element for determination of market share. If the firm 
which is charged with monopolization of certain market , is the sole or pre-dominant producer on 
it , that indicates that the corporation has big market share. On the contrary when there are many 
producers who can use and accommodate their production facilities to produce the commodity in 
question that is an evidence for lower market share.  
2. Monopoly conduct. 
 
45Brown Shoe v. U.S. ,370 U.S. 294  (-) 
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            The second element of the test applied by the courts, is the behavior of the monopoly on the 
relevant market - the conduct factor. The monopolistic position on the relevant market is not 
condemned by itself, but by the firm's abusive conduct. A firm with a vast monopoly power falls 
under Sherman Act, section 2 only if it tries to use the power to create barriers to entry. 
According to the theory of profit maximizing behavior, all firms will try to achieve and preserve 
superior position on the market which will enable them to earn more. For example : monopolistic 
corporations can maximize their profits by charging higher prices. There are also many other 
practices that are prohibited, but not enumerated in the statute. It is the job of the courts and 
enforcement agencies to identify and suppress such unlawful conducts. Examples for 
exclusionary practices are; espionage or sabotage, mergers, price discrimination, predatory 
pricing, tying arrangements and refusal to deal. Courts look at the firm's intent , in order to 
evaluate purpose and effects of certain conduct.46 In actual monopolization cases, the general 
intent is inferred from the conduct. The test is a dangerous probability of success. If the courts 
can not find such probability , they do not look further. The specific intent needs to be proved 
only in attempts to monopolize cases.    
           "To fall within section 2, the monopolist must have both the power to monopolize 
and the intent to monopolize. To read this passages to demand any specific intent 
of it, is a nonsense" 
            In this quote from the ALCOA47 case, Judge Hand clearly stated that he did not take into 
consideration the specific intent , while evaluating the firm's conduct. 
 
         3. Examples of prohibited exclusionary practices :.  
            a. Predatory pricing is conduct of a dominant firm trying to drive its competitors from the 
market by charging prices lower than its costs of production. This offense is caught by the 
 
46For ex:I If a firm drops prices , knowing that this would drow his competitor out of the market , if it initiates litigation 
without any cause or if it fails to predisclouse product innovation  
47U.S. v. Aluminium Co. of America , 2 cir , 148 F. 2d 416 ( 1945).  
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Sherman Act , section 2, which prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize. Protection 
of the competitors is not the sole argument predatory pricing to be condemned under this Act. 
Another reason for its prohibition is to protect the consumers. If a superior corporation is 
successful in driving its competitors out of the market, it can become a single seller , thus able to 
charge higher price to its buyers. In such case customers will also be worse off. 
                       Few pre-conditions must be met , in order this conduct to be successful. For example: a 
market should be suitable for monopolization , the competitors must be weak; and the benefit 
from the monopoly profit in future must be bigger than sustained loss. The corporation can 
incure its losses , by achieving a monopolistic position on the market which will enable it to 
charge higher price for its product. It seems likely that the monopoly profit will attract new 
entrants, thus a firm planing to engage in predatory pricing must take into consideration an 
excessive capacity of already existing competitors on the market and possible barriers to entry. If 
there is any possibility left for the competitors to produce additional units , the corporation will 
not be in the position to charge monopolistic prices and thus able to incure its losses. 
.                      To see whether the corporation was engaged in predatory pricing, the courts use a test 
based on the calculations of short run marginal costs. When a monopolist sells below its 
marginal cost , this evidences predatory pricing. Besides marginal costs, another test has been 
proposed by Turner and Areeda , i.e. the concept of average variable costs (AVC). The authors 
gave list of variable costs that courts should look at.48. The courts look to see if the prices are 
lower than variable costs, and if there is such a case , then it is an evidence of predatory pricing. 
The judges however face many difficulties in applying AVC test, especially: in identification and 
calculation of variable costs .They have also concluded , that it is not a suitable test for particular 
kinds of industries and it failes to take into account all relevant variables.  
                       Because of the failure of the former test, Joskow and Klevoric proposed a similar one 
based on the AVC costs with these presumptions : 
 
48This test was developed in 1975 
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1. A price below AVC is predatory 
2. If the price is somewhere between AVC and average total costs they are presumed to be 
predatory 
3. If there is a price increase after a price reduction49, it provides a further evidence of 
predatory pricing. 
            This practice is further prohibited by Clayton Act , section 2 50 . The corporation must choose 
only one price for selling its commodity, because this Act prohibits differentiation of the prices 
in different markets. Thus, the firm can not charge in the market with monopolistic structure a 
higher price with a purpose to recoupe its losses from the market elsewhere. The Recoupment 
theory explains such conduct of the firm as follows; it is selling under costs in the market with 
more lively competition with purpose to increase the monopoly power , and is charging higher 
prices in market where it alredy has monopolistic position . This theory is the basis for Clayton 
Act , section 2. 
            b. Tying arrangements. This conduct is on the detriment of competitors and customers as well.. 
By tying the product that is produced by a firm which is a monopolist on the market, it can force 
its customers to buy its other product that they don't need or can buy for better price somewhere 
else. Tie ins put the parties at unequal position and the monopolist is the one who dictates the 
terms. Buyers who refuse to go along with the tying arrangement might be punished with refusal 
to be supplied. By using tie-ins, dominant corporation can obtain higher profits , without being 
concerned with competition of tied product. 
                       Such conduct can also be a method for facilitating price discrimination. For example : if 
the customers buy both products they will pay a lower price, if they buy only a tying product, 
than they will have to pay more for the same commodity.So, the buyers will be charged 
according to whether they are going to buy only the tying product or the tied product as well.  
 
49Kamp, Economics and federal antitrust law ,1985  
50 amended by Robinson Patman Act (1936) 
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                       Tie ins are disagreeable with competitive market stucture because they create barriers to 
entry for new producers. New entrants will have to produce both products , because they will not 
be able to win market share in only one of the markets, especialy when particular products are 
closely connected and must be used together. 
                       A monopolist on the market may try to extend its monopoly into a second market by using 
this mean. For example , the Court in Hanry v.Dick Co"51. said:  
            "It has been very earnestly said that a condition restricting the buyer to use it only in 
connection with ink made by patentee is one of the character which gives to a patentee 
the power to extend his monopoly so as to cause it to embrace any subject , not within the 
patent." 
            This quote shows that tie-ins are used as sophisticated tools by monopolistic enterprises to gain 
control in the second product market and to engross its monopoly power. 
            c. Refusal to deal. The essence of this offense is that a monopolist can freely deal with 
whomever it chooses, but may not exercise this freedom if such conduct will result in 
maintenance of monopoly. Unilateral refusal to deal which is likely to result with maintenance of 
monopoly for longer time than necessary is actionable under Sherman act , section 2. 
Antimonopoly legislation secures 52 the monopolist's big obligation to behave fair on the market 
place. 
                       Some refusals to deal by other competitors that are not questionable under antitrust 
legislation, may be prohibited (by it) for corporation with a huge market share. The reason is that 
a monopolist has a higher duty for fair dealing with his customers . He might be the sole 
producer of a product needed by buyers to continue their business. By refusing to supply , the 
monopolist might drive the customers out of the market, which will lessen the competition. A 
 
51Henry v. Dick Co. S.C. of U.S., 1912 224 U.S. 1, 32, S. Ct. 364,56 L. Ed. 645 
52Clayton Act ,1914 specifies exclusionary practices.   
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monopolistic supplier can also threaten its distributors with refusal to deal if they do business 
with other company. Apparently, this conduct is on the detriment of the customers 
                       This practice also create barriers to entry, in the case where the monopolist refuses to 
supply new entrants on the market. 
                       The courts look at the intent of the monopolistic enterprise in order to draw a distinction 
between lawful and harmful refusal to deal. The plaintiff must show that the corporation accused 
for unilateral refusal to deal intentionally employed such practice, not for other reason but to 
prolong the duration of its monopoly or to secure the obedience of its trading partners. Otherwise 
it will just be the right of dominant partners to choose with whom to deal business in accordance 
with fair trade rules on the market. 
  
      7.8. Case studies 
        
                       In the United States v Aluminum Co. of America"53the Court of Appeals based its 
decision on the relationship between supply and demand elasticity , market power and market 
share. Once this case was decided, such analysis has become a regular tool used by Courts for 
reaching judgments in monopoly cases. 
                      ALCOA was a corporation engaged in production and sale of "ingot" aluminum. It secured 
its monopoly in manufacturing its product through holding two patents. In this case , Judge Hand 
took a broad approach to the interpretation of monopoly. He interpreted the motives of the 
Congress from historical perspective, looking at the time when the Sherman Act was passed. He 
considered not only bad economic consequences of monopolization of the market, but its social 
and moral impact on society as well. Judge Hand stated in his opinion that a monopolistic 
position on the market was enough the corporation to be condemned for violation of Sherman 
Act , section 2, although it did not employ prohibited practices:  
 
53U.S. v. Aluminium Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, Court of Appeals, (1945) 
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            "If power was acquired or maintained throughout improper means, the fact that monopoly 
was not used to extract from the consumers more than a fair profit is not a valid 
defense"54 
            Judge Hand thought that a company with monopoly power could start abusing such position at 
any time. This would have bad consequences for market structure with many small competitors, 
which was preferred55 by Congress. This broad approach to interpretation of monopoly has now 
been overruled by the decision in the Griffith case56. 
                      In order to find the existence of the monopoly power, the Court of Appeals , first defined 
the relevant market. It examined demand and supply elasticity . According to the information 
about demand and supply, the Court concluded that ALCOA was pretty sure that the actual need 
for the ingot on the market would be partly satisfied by its production and this consideration 
played a great role in determining the quantity to produce. As far as elasticity of demand was 
concerned, the Court of Appeals found that Aluminium Co. was the sole producer of "ingot" 
aluminum on the U.S. market. The Court did not regard competitors from abroad primarily 
because they had to bear high transportation costs and tariffs, although it did recognize that the 
foreign competition had some impact on ALCOA's pricing policy. According to these analysis 
the Court estimeted that ALCOA owned 90% of the market share on the market for "ingot" 
aluminum, which indicated strong monopoly position. In accordance with judge Hand's broad 
interpretation of monopoly, this evidence was enough for him to condemn the Aluminium Co. 
for monopolization in violation of Sherman Act , section 2. Now, it is not enough for the plaintiff 
only to prove to the courts that the corporation has monopolistic position on the market, but he 
also must show that the defendant used his market power in an unlawful way to obtain material 
advantages in trade, for its own benefit. 
 
54U.S. v. Aluminium Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, Court of Appeals, (1945) 
55Judge Hand opinion 
56 U.S. v. Griffith ,334 U.S. 100 
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                        The case Berkey Photo, Inc v. Eastman Kodak Co.57 confirms the operative rule of law 
for monopoly which expresses that an offense prohibited by Sherman Act section 2 has two 
elements : first; the possession of monopoly power and second this power to be used in such a 
way to enable acquisition or maintenance of monopoly. 
                      Kodak is manufacturing cameras , films and film papers. It has developed a special film 
which could only be used complementary with its camera. It started to advertise its improved 
film. This campaign was successful and increased sale both in cameras and camera films. 
However, at the same time Berkey's market share in cameras went down. Apperently , it accused 
Kodak for monopolization of the camera market, film market and paper market, that is prohibited 
under Sherman Act , section 2. 
                       The Court of Appeals applied two step test to estimate if Kodak had made such offense. 
First, it examined the situation on the markets to see if the corporation had monopoly power 
which would have enable itself to control the relevant market place. After considering  the 
figures that had shown the revenue and annual sales of cameras ( 90% ), of photograph films ( 
88% ) and of CP & P58 ( 95%) of all market sales , the Court of Appeals concluded that Kodak 
had a substantial monopoly power and that it was a dominant firm in the particular markets. 
Refering to Griffith dictum59, the Court of Appeals, underlined that the mere existence of 
monopoly power was not enough for a corporation to be convicted under Sherman Act ,section 
2. It went further on and examined the conduct of the firm , which was the second element of the 
monopoly test. The main issue was whether the defendant had violated antimonopoly legislation, 
by tieing the sales of its new film with its camera. In other words, whether Kodak had used its 
monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage and to monopolize another 
market. The Kodak defense was that it was normal for a firm competing in several fields to seek 
 
57 603 F  263 (2 nd Cir.) cert. den., 444 U.S. 1903, 100 S. Ct . 1061 ( 1980 ) 
58Kodak's Color Print and Processing Labaratories 
59U.S. v. Griffith ,334 U.S. 100 
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for the competitive advantages in efficient production and greater ability to develop 
complimentary product But the jury found that this tie in arraignment violated Sherman Act , 
section 2. 
                       Berkey also accused the defendant of failing to predisclose information about the 
innovation on time. In had been a past practice of Kodak always to predisclouse its 
improvements in order the industry to meet consumer's demand for complementary product for 
its innovation. The Court rejected this claim stating that it was not an exercise of monopoly 
power. It would have been a violation only if Kodak had refused to sell the film to Berkey, but 
the plaintiff only contended that Kodak's past offense had created a duty for Kodak to 
predisclouse information to other competitors. The Court found out that Berkey had failed to 
show that, because of Kodak's conduct it suffered actual harm. It clearly underlined public policy 
that supported the process of research , development and innovations. 
              
                      In the monopolization cases, first it is important for the courts to determine the relevant 
market. Definition of market has two components: product and geographic markets. In the U.S. 
v. Du Pont de Nemours and Co60. case , the Supreme Court worked out the concept of cross 
elasticity of demand as a test for defining the product market. 
                       Du Pont is a large corporation that produces more than 75 % of the cellophane in the U.S. 
The complaint alleged monopolization of interstate commerce in cellophane. 
            The Court had to determine the relevant market to see whether Du Pont had monopoly power 
that would enable it to control prices or exclude competitors. The relevant issue was the product 
market . If the product market was the only market for cellophane, Du Pont would have had a 
large market share to evidence the monopoly power. If , however , the relevant product market 
was the one for wrapping materials then , as defendant alleged, its market share would constitute 
 
60U.S.v. E. U. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. , 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
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less then 20% of all flexible packaging materials. The Court used the test for interchangeabillity 
between cellophane and other packaging materials. 
            "Court will not need to consider other substitutes than those which are 
substantially fungible with the monopolized product and sell at substantially same 
price."61 
            Interchangeability depends on how customers in their needs think of the products and if the 
products satisfy the same needs. The Court emphasized the importance of physical 
characteristics and use of commodities in question..  
                       Another test employed in this case for determining product market was "cross elasticity of 
the price": 
            " If slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of customers 
of other flexible wrapping materials to switch to cellophane ...it would be an indication 
for high elasticity of demand." 
            The Supreme Court's conclusion was that commodities with their specific characteristics need 
different wrapping materials, but the need for flexible wrappings was central and unchanged. So 
, the Court determined that the relevant product market had been the one for flexible wrappings 
and that Du Pont had not possessed the monopoly power to set its prices independently  
                      Dissenting opinion objected that the majority judges put too little weight on evidence of 
the great profits that Du Pont was earning. By their opinion if Du Pont's market share was not 
sufficient to enable it to behave independently from its competitors, then it would not have 
charged excessive prices and thus enable it to earn extra monopoly profit. Dissenting judges also 
concluded that the trial judge had wrongly concluded that If Du Pont raised its prices, then the 
market would have penalized it with smaller profits. The profit numbers, on the contrary, showed 
that Du Pont could set its prices independently from its competitors.  
 
61U.S.v. E. U. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) 
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                       It is interesting to compare this case with the ALCOA case. Aluminum Co. was convicted  
of its large market share . Normal profit earnings were not the proper defense in the eyes of the 
court. In Du Pont is case, on the contrary, although there was evidence of high earnings, it was 
not found guilty of monopolization in violation of Sherman Act , section 2 , because of its low 
market share. In case of monopolization , therefore, the U.S. courts consider all market features 
and conducts through analysis of the market place. Mere existence of high profit is not an 
outcome determinative or even a prime indicator of monopolization, because of the two step test, 
which the courts apply first to estimate the market share and second to analyze the conduct.  
             
                      Telex Corporation v. International Business Machines Corp.62 provides further guide  
            to how the courts determine the relevant product market and monopoly power of the corporation 
in question. 
                       International Business Machines Corp. was charged for monopolization of manufacturing 
, distribution and sale of pheriperial plugs. In this case Du Pont was used as a precedent. The 
District Court of Appeals reversed the trial verdict and concluded that the Du Pont standard was 
not applied correctly. The trial court reasoned that although there were some practical 
interchangeable possibilities , the product market was restricted because of Telex' commitment to 
supply only peripheral plugs compatible with IBM system. However, the District Court , 
recognized reasonable interchangeability as a standard for determining product market. The 
Court considered the elasticity of demand and found that the need for such peripheral plug was 
low. The Court of Appeals also examined the production facilities of other competitors and 
found that other manufacturers could adapt their plants with minimal costs to make them 
compatible with IBM system.. This indicated high degree of substitutability of production. 
According to these facts , the Court determined the product market to be wider then the one for 
peripheral plugs. On such defined product market IBM's share was not big enough to evidence 
 
62367 F. Supp. 258, aff'd in part ,rev'd  in part 510 F . 2nd . 894 ( ). 
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monopoly position. In absence of monopoly power that would enable the corporation to control 
the market, apperently the Court of Appeals reject the charge that IBM violated Sherman Act, 
section 2. 
            
                       U.S. v. Grinell 63 is another example of how the Supreme Court applies tests to determine 
the relevant product and geographic market. 
                       Grinell is corporation that manufactured plumbing supplies and fire sprinkler system. It 
owned 76% of the stock of ADT, 89 % of the stock of AFA and 100 % of the stock of Holmes. 
This fact was the reason Grinell to be seen as a single company and to be charged for 
monopolization in manufacturing plumbing supplies , under Sherman Act ,section 2 , instead 
under Sherman Act , section 1. 
                       To determine whether the corporation had monopoly power the Court first determined the 
relevant market. The Court applied a different test from the one used in Du Pont case. The Court 
found that: 
           " There were substitutes for the accredited central station service. But none of 
them appears to operate on the same level as the central station service so as to 
meet the interchangability test of Du Pont." 
            The Court applied the standard of single use. According to it, the Supreme Court did not see why 
not to combine in the single market number of different products, if that combination reflects 
commercial realities. The Court concluded that customers were not really concerned with the 
price of the product but with safety of their business. Consequently,the Court concluded that 
there was a single product market for the entire accredited central station service business. 
                       The second step was to analyze the relevant geographic market, to find out whether it was 
local or national. The Court considered the price relations (actual sales pattern) and costs of 
transport, too. The Supreme Court also realized that buyer's preferences had a great role to play 
 
63384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
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because they were barriers to sell in the particular market. Considering the nature of the product , 
the national schedule of the price rates , and the terms for sale, the Court decided that the whole 
U.S. was the geographic market.64 
                       This case is important because it contains the presently accepted definition for 
monopolization, i.e. that mere acquisition of monopoly power is not enough for one corporation 
to be convicted under Sherman act , section 2 , but the conviction requires the willful acquisition 
and maintenance of that power. The Supreme Court recognized that there were some exceptions 
if the acquisition was due to either the power or growth as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen or historic accident. 
                      After the Court had considered all the relevant issues from this case and found that Grinell 
violated Sherman Act, section 2 , it ordered divestiture as most proper remedy. The reason for it 
was the structure of the corporation.   
            
                       Besides Du Pont and Grinell which are examples of how the courts estimate relevant 
market and dominance on it, the U.S. v United Shoe Machinery65 case is an example of how the 
courts estimate that there was an abusive exploitation on the market. 
                      United Shoe Machinery was charged with monopolization of interstate 
commerce,monopolization and attempts to monopolize the distribution in shoe supplies. It was 
sued for violation of Sherman Act , section 2.  
                Estimating the supply, demand and other competitors on the market , the Court found that 
the firm owned 75% market share of all shoe machinery supplies. It concluded that it evidenced 
monopoly strength big enough to control the market. United Shoe Machinery's market 
dominance was neither attributable to research and development, natural advantages, 
corporation's economic scale nor to inevitable economic laws. The mere fact that the corporation 
 
64Although price varied to meet local conditions. 
65347 U.S. 521, ( 1954 ). 
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had the monopolistic position was not enough it to be condemned for violation of Sherman Act, 
section 2. The further step for Court was to see whether the defendant abused its monopoly 
strength to preserve and achieve the superior position on the relevant market. 
                      First, the judges examined the defendant's leasing policy and beneficial system of 
replacement and repair to see if they had imposed limitations on the competitors. Judge 
Wyzanski reasoned that such policy had enabled United Shoe Machinery to create barriers to 
entry for potential competitors. He defined barriers to entry as: 
"Something that makes it difficult for a potential competitors to enter the field." 
                      Secondly, the Court examined the rates of return. It concluded that this corporation had 
facilitated discrimination by fixing different rates of return. On the markets with vigorous 
competition, United Shoe fixed smaller rates, whereas in other market places where competition 
was of lesser significance, it fixed rates of return were higher. 
                     Although the United Shoe Machinery had not charged excessive prices , the Court 
concluded that the defendant had deliberately chosen leasing policy and lower prices with 
purpose to suppress the competition on the market for shoe machinery ,which would enable it to 
live a "quite life". In order to break up United Shoe's monopoly power, the Court ordered the 
corporation to offer the machines for sale , in addition to offering them for lease. 
            
                      U.S. v. American Can Company66 is another example of how the Court estimates the 
monopoly conduct on the market. This company was charged with violations of Sherman Act, 
sections 1 and 2. It was the largest corporation on the market, which by persuading, inducing or 
coercing forced other competitors to sell out. It then bought up their plants for different values, 
but always more than they were worth. To create barriers to entry for other potential competitors 
, American Can made a deal with the largest manufacturer of caning machinery that obliged the 
supplier to produce such equipment exclusively for the defendant for six years. To restrict the 
 
6620 256 U.S. 706, 1921. 
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supply American Can shut up all the plants that it bought. By lowering the output this company 
was able to control the price, although it denied any intent to do so. Because of the defendant's 
conduct, the prices went up and induced new entries on the market. To keep the rate high, 
American Can bought cans from its new rivals, but the money resources ran out. The 
corporation's defense was first, that it had made many improvements in making and selling cans, 
and second that the prices had been excessive only for short time. The Court refused these 
arguments. In the decision of the case judge Rose expresed his opinion that the mere size of the 
corporation was not a crime , but then added that: 
           "The law wishes that industrial and trading corporations shall operate under the 
checks and balances imposed by free and unrestrained competition" . 
                       Judge Rose interpreted the declared policy of the Congress and concluded that the 
defendant's behavior had been against the public wealth. The reason for that was the impact of 
the firm's conduct on the market that destroyed the competition. Furthermore judge Rose stated 
that monopolistic abuse of the market had been a public danger and contrary to the legislator 
who had wanted to preserve competition on the market. From his reasoning it is clear that a 
superior firm can not be condemned for its monopolistic power, unless it uses such a power to 
drive other competitors from the market , opposite to the antitrust goal.  
                      Considering what remedy to impose on American Can the Court criticized the dissolution 
because it was not fast enough for purpose of antimonopoly legislation. In their opinion such 
remedy was pointed against the company's size, instead of against the conduct. Since the time 
this case was decided, dissolution was not considered as a proper solution for suppression of 
monopoly and rarely was imposed on other corporations, charged for the same violation.  
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                      In Greyhound Computer Corp. Inc. v. IBM Corp.67, Transamerica Computer  Co. 
Inc. v.IBM 68 and California Computer  Products  Inc v. IBM69, standard pricing practices of 
IBM were the target of the Court's inquiry.  
                     In Greyhound, the plaintiff claimed that by using technical discounts unrelated to costs or 
demand conditions, IBM had monopolized the  market for general purpose computers.The 
Court's decision was that IBM 's conduct excluded other competitors from this market. 
                      In Transamerica where IBM was charged with predatory pricing, the Court held that price 
reduction was reasonable, because it was justified by design changes and above - average costs. 
                      The most important decision on this issue, pricing practices, was in California Computer 
Products Inc v. IBM. The Court concluded that IBM only responded to price changes forced by 
its competitors and that a corporation with a monopoly position on the market can defend its 
lawfully achieved superior position on the market by the device of technical improvements. With 
tis decision the Court created an exception and an excuse for superior enterprises. Clearly the 
Court was trying not to cause any adverse effects to a corporation's vigor for innovations and to 
escape the trap that antimonopoly law could create for  big firms which  invest their money in 
research and development. 
            
                       UTAH PIE Co. v Continental Baking Co provides a good illustration of the monopoly 
conduct known as predatory pricing. 
                       Utah Pie had the largest share of the market for frozen pies in the Salt Lake City. It had 
the lowest prices, because of its natural advantage i.e. (location). New entrants started increasing 
their market shares by lowering their prices. Utah Pie challenged various practices of its 
competitors i.e., Continental, Carnation and Pets Co. Each of them alredy had a large market 
share on some other geographic market. 
 
67559f . 2d 488 ( ). 
68481 F. Supp , 965, 698 F. 2nd 1377 ( ). 
69613 F.  2nd  727 ( ). 
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                      Utah Pie's first complaint was against Pet Milk Company. It accused this company for 
industrial espionage and predatory pricing. Evidences showed that because of its pricing policy 
Pet Milk had sustained losses, although it was not proved that it had recouped them on another 
market. It was clearly indicated that this corporation had charged higher price in the markets 
where it had had a significant market share. Two other defendants Continental and Carnation Co. 
also reduced their charges for the product and at the same time they were selling the same pies 
for higher prices in other places. They maintained a below price structure and worked with 
losses. 
                      On the Utah Pie application, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals that stated that the impact from the respondent's acts on the market , was insignificant. 
Basis for their judgment was the fact that Utah Pie constantly increased its sales and still earned 
profit. The Supreme Court interpreted Sherman Act , section 2 , as not prohibiting common price 
competition. Such price reductions should be prohibited only if they were injurious to the 
competition.70. The Court analyzed the evidence introduced on the trial and concluded that the 
respondents deliberately reduced their prices, in order to overtake the relevant market and to 
increase their market power. In addition the Court also found predatory intent in the actions of 
these three companies. Therefore the Court concluded that their behavior was unlawful and bed 
for competition. Pricing policy of other companies, forced Utah Pie to reduce its prices which 
made it a less effective competition force. Clearly with their pricing policy Utah Pie's 
competitors lost much money, but they gained a market share. At the same time, Utah Pie lost its 
customers. Other competitors recouped their money from other markets, but Utah Pie was only 
operating on Salt Lake City market, so it was unable to do the same. The Court said that it could 
not support competitors when they were trying to increase their market shares by using unlawful 
means. 
 
70Utah Pie Co v. Continental Baking Co.,386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
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            This judgement of the Supreme Court, perheps also expresses public policy that is protectiv for 
small business which is highly important in local areas. 
 
                       In MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T Co. 71 the Court stated an exception to the 
rule that a company can freely exercise its will in deciding with whom to do the business. 
                      AT & T was a corporation with monopolistic position on the market for long distance 
communication. It was accused for refusal to deal with MCI. This refusal caused a great loss of 
business to its customer 
                     To see whether the AT & T really violated the law by refusing to deal or merely exercise 
the freedom to choose its customers, the Court developed the "essential facilities" theory. The 
essence of it is that the corporation in possession of such facilities must allow other competitors 
to use them if they need such facilities for their process of production. 
            The Court identified four elements, necessary to establish liability of the monopolist: 
1) A Monopolist must control essential facilities.  
2) The Monopolist must be able to offer these facilities for use. 
3) It can not reasonably be expected from the competitors to duplicate such essential facilities. 
4) The competitor must have been refused when seeking to use these facilities. 
            The Court considered the four requirements and found that AT & T's conduct satisfied them. 
Therefore, it found that the defendant had been guilty under Sherman Act, section 2. In its 
decision the Court concluded that the proper remedy for this case was an ordere for AT & T to 
do business with the MCI Communication Corp. 
   
      7.9. Conclusion 
 
 
71708 F .2nd 1081 ( ). 
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                     After compliting the examination of this section, it is obvious that U.S. had regulated 
monopolistic position on the market since 1890 when Sherman Act was passed. It does not 
prohibit the dominant position, but the behavior of the monopoly which might result with 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly. In order to enforce this Act, an effective system of 
enforcement is developed. Parties with role to play in enforcement are administrative agencies 
and private plaintiffs who can seek damages or injunction in District Courts. Remedies that can 
be imposed are with purpose to prevent and punish. 
                     Besides the U.S., the most important features of the antimonopoly law will be further 
analized in the parts for EC and Macedonia. Characteristics of antimonopoly regulative such as 
relevant laws, enforcement agencies, standing, judicial review and sanctions will be further 
examined in the following sections of this study. I will make a comparison between them, deal 





             
8. REGULATION OF MONOPOLY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
 
      8.1. Origin of EC competition rules 
 
                      After the second world war, the European nations accepted the idea for European 
Cooperation. They signed an international Treaty and developed several institutions such as, 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation and Council of Europe. Yet the real origin of 
the competition rules is the Treaty of Paris (1951), establishing European Coal and Steel 
Community. The provisions of this Treaty still govern matters concerning coal and steel, so they 
are exempt from the Treaty of Rome. The relevant articles are article 4, which prohibits 
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discrimination in price and delivering terms that interfere with the freedom of the suppliers in 
doing business and article 5, which is concerned with preservation of normal conditions of 
competition. Even more important are articles 65 and 66 which embody main principles of the 
enforcement. As far as this study is concerned article 66 (7) is the most significant, because for 
the first time the notion of abuse of dominant position is laid down. Actually it deals with de jure 
and de facto monopoly. 
                       The success of the Treaty of Paris in coordinating of coal and steel industry led to further 
economical integration of Europe and resulted with exeptance of the Treaty of Rome (1957), 
which established European Economic Community. This Treaty came into force in 1958. It 
creates mutual obligations and it is more than a mere agreement. Thus, a special legal system 
based on principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and primacy of competition rules72 was 
created to enable enforcement of the Treaty. Main goals to be achieved with this Treaty are 
preservation of a single market, economical and political integration, equity and fairness, 
protection of small and medium sized undertakings and increased efficiency. They are 
underlined in article 2 of the Treaty of Rome which states that : 
           "The Community shall have as its task by establishing the common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of member states , to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities , a 
continuous and balanced expansion , an increase in stability , an accelerated 
raising of the standard of the living and closer relations between the states 
belonging to it." 
            The Rome Treaty establishing EEC contained special provisions designed to assure system of 
effective and fair competition: articles 85 and 86. Now, Treaty of Rome, as amended by 
 
          72 The principal of proportionality assures that means corespond with aims to be achieved. Subsidierity enables some 
actions to be undertaken by the Community itself if member states are not able to achieve the result on their own. 
Primacy of competition rules means that Treaty competition rules have primacy over domestic (protective) 
legislative.  
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Maastricht Treaty of European Union contains rules on competition in part three, title one, 
chapter one, articles 85 to 94. Article 85 & 86 are not amended. 
 
 
      8.2. Relevant laws governing competition cases 
 
                       Besides article 86 which is the most important for monopoly cases and which is analyzed 
in the further sections of this study, Treaty of Rome contains other articles governing 
competition matters. For example; article 3 provides measures and activities for achievement of 
EC goals. Article 3 (f) assures that: 
           "The institutions of the system are ensuring that the competition in the common 
market is not distorted." 
                      Article 85 applies to agreements, concerted practices and decisions between two or more 
undertakings, in cases where these actions affect European single market and distort competition 
in. 
                      Futhermore, the European Community passed many other regulatives relevant for 
competition cases. One of them is Regulation 17/62 enacted in 1962. It contains the procedural 
basis for implementation and enforcement of competition rules. The basis for this Regulation is 
the article 87 (1)73 of the Rome Treaty, but the Regulation is modeled on German Legislation. 
Powers of the Commission to investigate and make inquiries are vested in article 9 (2) and 
specifically enumerated in article 14 of this Regulation: 
a) to examine the books and other business records; 
b) to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records; 
c) to ask for oral explanation on the spot; and  
 
73Article 8Ar7 (1) provides that Council acting unanimously on the proposal from the Commission: 
          "shall adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give the effect to the principles set out in the articles 85 & 86". 
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d) to enter any premises, land and means of transport of the undertaking. 
            Article 20 of the Regulation lays down the principle of confidentiality, so it assures that the 
information obtained in this way can only be used for investigation purposes. 
            Regulation 2988/74 contains limitation periods in the proceedings and enforcement of the 
decision.Commission Regulation 99/63 EEC of 25 July 1963 is concerned with the hearings of 
the undertakings under investigation. This regulation protects rights of the subjects of 
competition law and enables lawful procedure.Other examples for secondary legislation are: 
Council Regulation 19/65, Commission Regulation 417/85 and the Memorandum of the 
Commission for Concentration of Enterprises. Regulations 26/62 and 49/62 modify the 
competition rules for agriculture, and Regulations 141/62 & 1017/68 deal with transport by land 
and inland waterway.   
                      In order to provide more informations for undertakeings, the European Commission issued 
"A practical guide on how to deal with Investigations by the European Commission"74, which 
makes clear powers of the Commission and how it obtains the information. 
       
      8.3.Organs, proceedings and sanctions 
            
                       Regulation 17/62, more precisely, article 15 (2a) states that the administrative organ in 
charge for enforcement of EC Competition Law is the Commission. Actually, DG IV which is 
the competition department of the Commission. It manages day to day work under supervision of 
the Commissioners. This department consists of directories A, B, C, D and E. Directorate A 
coordinates individual cases, state monopolies and public enterprises. Directorates B, C and D 
are in charge of abuse of dominant position, and Directorate E of state aid. There is an Advisory 
 
741989, pp. 1-3,17-19. 
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Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies as well, which is composed of one official 
appointed by each member state.75 
                       Commission can initiate action ex officio or can act on the request of interested parties, 
but that depends on the organ's discretion which cases will be primary analyzed. The 
Commission conducts investigation and collects all relevant data. There are two types of 
inspections, compulsary and voluntary. The Commission issues statement of objections and 
informs the undertaking . Afterward, the relevant company can request a hearing, which is not 
public and enables every person to be orally heard. Before rendering the decision, Commission 
must consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies. After the 
decision is passed, undertakings can make an application to the Court of Justice. Persons that are 
entitled to make an application are member states, natural and legal persons who have a 
legitimate interest. The basis for Judicial control is provided in article 172 of the Treaty of Rome 
and further specified in article 17 of the Regulation 17/62. Because the Court of Justice has been 
overloaded with work, a Court of First Instance has been established in Luxembourg. Most of 
competition cases, since 1989 were brought there.76. Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome 
elaborates the "Preliminary References" procedure. According to it, the EC courts can give their 
opinion, even in cases where lawsuit is filed in the member state's courts if they ask for such 
help.  
                       As far as remedies are concerned, those that can be imposed by the Commission are 
penalties, fines, daily penalties and order to cease and desist. The imposed fines can go up to one 
million ECU's or 10% of the turnover for the previous year. But, in most cases the fines are 
usually arbitrary. Daily penalties may be imposed to compel adherence to the order to cease and 
desist. If the undertakings make an appeal, penalty payment will be suspended, but interest will 
 
75Regulation 17 article 4. 
76Marc Daurmont, a franch cancelor for the Court of First Instance said:  
" It is in the interest of all countries to respect the Court's decisions, next time it might rule in your favour and you will expect 
other the side to be obedient. Vecer, 22,10,1994 :18. 
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be charged.77 As far as private parties are concerned they can ask for damages only in the 
member states courts and according to their national law. The scope of the available interim 
relief varies from country to country and depends on the conditions in the particular state. 
Consequently there is a dichotomy in enforcement of the article 86. When cases are heard in the 
member state's courts the member states can declare the conduct illegal and can issue a 
prohibitory or mandatory injunction plus award restitution of the money.  
 
      8.4. Relations between EC and member states 
             
                       Member states, as well as European Community have their own competition laws. That is 
why, the relations between them become an important issue to this study. In addition, there are 
two different directions of competition policy in the EC and its member states. While member 
states are more concerned with protection of freedom of competition, the EC is more concerned 
with guarding freedom of movement and ensuring equal conditions and opportunities for selling 
goods without any discrimination with purpose to preserve a single market. 
                       There are three dimensions of the relations between EC and member states. First is 
coordination between Commission while conducting investigation and national authorities. The 
second dimension of this question concerns enforcement of Community law by national courts, 
and the third concerns the parallel application of Community and national laws. Regulation 17 
article 11 is relevant for the first dimension. It provides for cooperation between the Commission 
and the member states. Article 20 says that national authorities shall be informed by the 
Commission. This also means that they shall have all the copies of the relevant documents, but 
the problem of confidentiality arises. The second dimension of this question concerns 
enforcement of the Community law by national courts which is provided in article 88 of the 
Treaty of Rome: 
 
77Goyder E.C. Competition law ,1983. 
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          "Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of article 87 the 
authorities in member states shall rule ...on abuse of dominant position in the 
common market in the accordance with their law of their country and with the 
provisions of article 86." 
            So, legal system of the EC has dual enforcement by its own organs and by the organs of its 
member states. 
                     Relevant to this question is the Commission's Draft Notice on the Application of Articles 
85 and 86 by National Courts, which underlines the need for cooperation. Collaboration is 
needed to achieve "strict, effective and consistent application of the Community law.78". But it is 
not said how to facilitate such cooperation. 
                      Besides absence of means to facilities collaboration between EC and member states courts, 
another problem of uniform application of the Community law arises, the role of national courts 
in obtaining damages by private parties. The reason for such problem is the difference that exists 
between competition laws of the member states. This is underlined in the third dimension of this 
issue. Basically if behavior is prohibited by both, then parallel proceedings can be initiated by 
both jurisdictions. But if the conduct which is lawful in the member state is prohibited under 
article 86, then it should be prohibited in that state as well79. Similarly, conduct which does not 
violate article 86 but which does violate member state legislation is also forbidden. The principle 
of parallel application was laid down in Wilhelm v. BundesKartelamt.80 Parallel application is 
possible if it does not prejudice uniform application of Community law. 
 
      8.5. State monopoly and special grant of rights 
 
 
78Commission's Draft Notice on the Application of Articles 85 and 86 ( ). 
79principle of supremacy of the Community law.  
80case 14/68 (1969) E.C.R. 1 : (1969) CMLR 100. 
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                       Competition rules deal both with private and with state actions that might isolate national 
markets. Two provisions of the Treaty of Rome are important for this issue, articles 37 and 90. 
Both of them forbid enacting new measures that might affect the development of trade. The 
functioning of member state's monopolistic enterprises should not prevent progress of the single 
market. 
                      First important article is article 37 of the Treaty of Rome whish provides that: 
           "Member states should progressively adjust any state monopoly of a commercial 
character,...there will be no discrimination regarding the conditions under which 
goods are procured."81 
            This article applies to anybody through the member states which "directly or indirectly 
supervises, determines or appreciably influences imports or exports between the member states." 
The Court of Justice has stated that: 
           "Member states should not enact measures enabling private undertakings to escape from 
the constraints imposed by the competitive scheme of the Treaty. Any national measure 
which had the effect of facilitating the abuse of the dominant position capable of 
effecting trade between the member states would be incompatible with articles 30-34."82  
                      Second is article 90 which concerns undertakings having special grant of rights from the 
state, such as monopolies entrusted with operation of services of general economic interest or 
with revenue producing character. Such "undertakings shall be subjects to the rules contained in 
this treaty, in particular to rules of the competition". Through the application of articles 90-92 of 
the Treaty of Rome, the Commission is trying to protect the single market from distortion that 
can be caused by the state participation in regulation of commerce or trade. Yet, these Treaty 
provisions should not prevent fulfillment of the tasks of such monopolies, either. 
 
81Article 37 ,Treaty of Rome. 
82INNO v. ATAB 13/77,1977 ECR 2115 ,1978 1CMLR 283. 
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                        Secondary legislation relevant to this issue is directive 80/723 that enables public 
authorities to exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence over undertakings in which 
they have ownership interest. Third directive under 90(3) adopted in 1988 deals with the 
competition in the telecommunications market, which forced member states to open up their 
telecommunication terminal service markets. The same pressure was put on the postal services 
and employment agencies. 
                       Judical analysis of the cases show that there can be some exceptions to the rule to break 
up state monopolies. In Italy v. Commission, an example of this principle is introduced.83 If a 
particular company is a state monopoly this could create an absolute barrier to entry and isolate 
national market. Thus, article 37 might substantially affect the activities of the government and 
force it to take back the legal rights alredy given to state monopoly.  
                       State monopolies can use as a valid defence the fact that they could not function properly 
if article 90 is going to be applied. But in the Fedtab case 84, the Court clearly held that 
undertakings can not use it as a defense when the competition was reduced by member state's 
legislation and esspecialy if such legislation gave enough space for maneuvering. The Court also 
underlined that permissive national legislation of prices or industry, if it was merely an 
encouragement, could not provide immunity from the Commission's prosecution. 
                       This examination shows that one of the means to achieve and to preserve a common 
market is to regulate the state and other rights granted monopolies, that otherwise can be 
disagreeable with the unity of the single market. 
       
      8.6. Analysis of article 86 
             
 
83Korah, EEC competition law and practice. 
84209, ECR 3125:, 3 CMLR 134 (1980). 
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                       Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome is aimed at unilateral conduct of a single firm and lays 
down the concept of the abuse by an undertaking in a dominant position. It does not refer 
specially to monopoly, but it is based on a wider concept. Actually, it is concerned with the 
conduct of a firm with substantial market share, that can behave independently and can control 
market place. On the 1.1. 1958, this article came into force together with the Treaty of Rome, but 
it has a direct effect85 since 13.3. 1962, when Regulation 17/62 was passed. The article provides: 
           "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common or in 
a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so 
far as it may affect trade between member states ." 
Such abuse may particularly consist in: 
a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading  
conditions; 
b) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of the consumers; 
            c) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transaction with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
            d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contract 86. 
This article has four elements : 
1) Dominant position on the common market or a substantial part of it. 
2) Abuse of the dominant position. 
3) By one or more undertakings. 
4) If it may effect trade between the member states. 
 
85 i.e. citizens of member states can directly rely on article 86 in their national courts. 
86Treaty of Rome, article 86. 
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            The first step is to define a dominant position. Usually it is defined as the position on the 
European market that enables the firm to act independently from other competitors. The Court of 
Justice estimates the company strength by its market share. The relevant market could be the 
whole EC market or a significant part of it. Substantial part may be, for example, two or more 
states or even an area from one member state. Even the capital city of one member state can be 
an important part of the common market.  
            The second element to be analyzed under article 86 concerns abuse of superior position. This 
article prohibits the conduct of the company and not merely its size and strength. This element is 
placed in the second part of article 86, and contains a non exhaustive list of examples of 
prohibited practices and enumerates abusive behaviors.  
            Article 86(a) outlaws unfair purchase or selling prices and imposition of other unfair market 
terms which discriminate customers. In some cases even if the company has a small market 
power, it can be accused and punished for exclusionary conduct. More characteristic features of 
such conducts will be examined in detail in section 8.8.a. below. 
            Article 86(b) explicitly states that it is concerned with protection of consumers, not of 
competition. Only a firm that is dominant on the market could raise its prices by restricting the 
output and in the absence of effective competition on the market. Examples of this kind of abuse 
are fixing of the quantity, loyalty rebates, etc. 
Analysis of article 86(c) must focus on three elements: 
1) The transaction has to be equivalent (i.e.,customers must be located at the same place on the 
distribution chain); 
2) Dissimilar conditions in terms of prices; and 
3) The other party must be placed at a competitive advantage. 
         Examples of this conduct are discrimination on the basis of nationality, loyalty rebates (as 
distinguished from the quantity rebates), etc. 
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         Finally, article 86(d) refers to tying arrangements. The Court usually looks at the nature, 
durability, composition, construction and use of tied products. This form of abuse will be 
examined in section 8.8.d. below. 
         Further examples of abuse are threats to other competitors on the market with purpose to 
strengthen the dominant position, refusal to deal, mergers as a method for obtaining monopoly 
etc. 
         The third element to be analized under article 86 is abuse by one or more undertakings, but my 
focus in this paper is solely on abuse of the market performed by only one competitor with 
monopolistic position. 
         The final part of article 86 defines its jurisdictional reach. It clarifies when the EC rules should 
be applied and when rules of the member states are applicable. This element states that the 
proceedings can be initiated by the EC organs only if the abuse"effects trade between member 
states". The test is whether the conduct in question can harm the common market or only internal 
market of the member state. This fourth element also enables article 86 to have extraterritorial 
reach. Foreign companies that operate in the common market can be caught by this article if their 
behavior affects trade between the member states. Also if the dominant company is a subsidiary 
controlled by a parent company which does not operate directly on the EC market, the parent 
company can be prosecuted , under direct effects doctrine developed by the Court, which permits 
Commission to claim jurisdiction against the parent company, even if it does not have any 
physical involvement in the abusive conduct. 
 
      8.7.Judical analysis 
 
                    Some economic concepts are relevant for the analysis under article 86 such as monopoly 
power that enables market dominance. In theory, monopoly power is defined as a market power 
of a dominant enterprise that 100% controls the market. In practice, lower market share is needed 
to evidence monopoly power. Another economic concept, relevant for this issue is entry barrier 
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imposed by a monopoly, in order to preclude potential competitors to enter the market. The 
notion of interbrand competition has also become very important, lately. The essence is that there 
is not only competition between intrabrand competitors, but also there is competition between 
companies dealing in different types of products. Even this interbrand competition influates 
pricing and marketing policy of the undertakings. 
                     The test which is usually used by the Court to determine the dominant position on the 
market has two steps:  
            1) First the Court must determine whether the undertaking is dominant on the relevant market; 
and 
            2) Second, it must determine whether that dominant position has been abused. 
         In order to examine whether the alleged company really has the monopoly power, the Court 
must begin with defining the relevant market. It encompasses product market87,geographic 
market, and (in some cases) a time dimension.  
                    The first step is to define the product market. The requirement is that the product or 
groups of products are sufficiently homogenous, so they could easily be distinguished from other 
products. In particular, the Court must examine the substitutes from both the supply and the 
demand side. On the demand side the Commission has traditionally looked at the products' use, 
quality and price. It uses the test of interchangeability88. This is usually measured by physical 
attributes, particular use, the needs of special classes of buyers and barriers to entry. Another 
aspect of the market is the cross elasticity of demand89. A high cross elasticity is an indicator of 
interchangeability. The Commission in its determination of the product market has used the 
German competition law as a model. The test to estimate relevant product market is an arbitrary 
one, and according to Korah90, the Commission usually examines what firm is being accused, 
 
87Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Backing Co., 386 U.S. 685,(    ). 
88Cases 6 and 7/73 1 CMLR 309 ( 1974 ). 
89Cases 6 and 7/73 1 CMLR 309 ( 1974 ). 
90Korah V. EEC Competition law and practice, 1986. 
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which products are involved in the complaint, who buys them, and what else could be used by 
those customers with minimal adaption of their business. 
                     Second, the Court must determine in which geographic area a firm has a dominant 
position. Only abuse that occurs on the common market can be prosecuted by the Commission. 
The relevant geographic market is the one on which the firm is active. Another definition of 
geographic market says that it is an area in which the product is sold and conditions of marketing 
are sufficient homogenous. Geographic market can also be defined as a place where the 
conditions of competition are objectively the same and where there are no important barriers to 
entry like transportation costs.  
                    The third element of the Court's determination of the relevant market concerns the period 
of time during which the company held the allegedly dominant position and whether it has been 
dominant longer than necessary. 
                    After defining the relevant market, the Court next looks at the market share. A large 
market share shows dominance per se. Not only clear huge market shares, such as 70% or 80% 
but even 45% market share is enough to show dominance if other competitors are much smaller. 
The UBC case91 provides an example. If the market included all food, the company's market 
share would be infinitesimal, if all fruit it would be de minimis, if only soft fruit small but 
significant, but if banana is the relevant market, then UBC`s market share would be substantial.92 
However, the Court recognized that market share is not the most significant evidence of the 
dominance, since it can be obtained even in an environment of lively competition. In Hoffman 
La Roche v. Commission, the Court stated that market share was not the most important 
indicator of the existence of a dominant position. It recognized that " its importance varies from 
market to market according to the structure of these markets especially as far as production, 
supply and demand are concerned."93  
 
9127/76. 
92The product that is produced is banana, U.B.C. v Commission 27/76. 
93 Hoffman La Roche v. Commission 85/76, (1979) ECR 461. 
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                    Thus, other evidence is still needed such as entry barriers, potential competitors and the 
position of the other companies. In Hoffman La-Roche, the Court said:  
        "Dominant position does not preclude some competition , but enables the undertakings 
which profits by it, if not to determine at least to have an appreciable effect on the 
conditions under which the competition will develop and in any case to act largely in 
disregard of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment." 
         The courts thus investigate several aspects of the market and the company's position on it to 
determine which is the relevant market and whether the undertaking has a superior position on it. 
                    After having established that an undertaking is dominant on the relevant market, the 
Court next moves to consider the question of abuse. The mere possession of market power is not 
per se illegal, but there must be an active effort by the company to use the monopoly power in 
order to strengthen or extend the durability of its position on the market. It must be an active 
abuse with anticompetitive effects in order to constitute a violation of article 86. Here are some 
examples of the exclusionary practices: 
                     a) Excessive price. An undertaking having dominant position is able to charge higher 
prices to its customers. The test used by the Court is whether: " the price is excessive in relation 
to the economic value of the service provided."94 This is a kind of price discrimination that 
enables a dominant undertaking to extract more than a fair profit. It is very hard to determine 
when the prices are excessive. In addition the General Motor's test, the Commission occasionally 
uses the alternative deduced logic test95. The essence of this test is that the Commission relies on 
the deduction made upon comparative estimation of the reasonable prices in relation to prices 
charged before by that undertaking and prices charged by other producers of the same product. 
But the Commission faces many hardships when it undertakes full scale analysis of prices and 
tries to gather all necessary information. Sometimes these prices are justified because of the need 
 
94General Motors Continental 26/75 (1975) ECR 1367,1378, 1379. 
95Green N. , Hartly T. C. , Usher J. A. , SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET ; 1991. 
60 
to recoup research and development costs, because of the need to make provisions for future 
research with respect to a product having a short life cycle, and because of high initial marketing 
and distribution costs.96 
         It should also be mentioned that excessive prices do not automatically suppress the competition 
but, on the contrary, attract new entrants to the market with the lure of big profit. 
                             b) Abusive discounts. It is an act of deduction, granted by dominant undertaking on 
the market to its customers proportional to the total bill. A superior company can give discounts 
in order to make its buyers loyal. The company may disclose how much it will reduce its prices 
or can just grant discount without saying how much it will be. When discounts are transparent 
the buyers may plan to buy from other competitors, but if there is a mystery about the discount, 
then they will be reluctant to buy from other producers97, because perhaps such conduct will 
decrease their possibility to buy the product for less money. Obviously, it is a method used by a 
superior company to overtake the buyers from its competitors. They might operate to tie the 
distributor to the main supplier and to create barriers to entry for potential rivals. Abusive 
discounts can also distort competition at the buyer's level, if there is a discrimination among 
buyers in granting such discount. So, wholesalers that will buy the same product for less money 
can afterwards charge lesser price and be more competitive than the other wholesaler who is not 
using that discount. Discounts can only be justified if they are value discounts that enable cost 
saving in transport and administration of the goods. 
                    c) Refusal to supply is another example of exclusionary practice. This practice is not  
illegal per se. In general, dominant undertaking can freely exercise its freedom to decide whom 
to make business with. But if refusal to supply is impediment for the customers to continue its 
business which will result with distortion in the system of competition, then such practice will 
violate article 86. The general rule is that a dominant firm cannot refuse to supply its 
 
96MMC report on supply of Credit car franchising service,1982. 
Report on Chlordiazepoxide and Diazepam 1973 HC 197 . 
97Green N. , Hartly T. C. , Usher J. A. , SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET ; 1991. 
61 
longstanding customer if the customer does not have an alternative source of supply. The reason 
such practice to be forbidden is that it limits the market, lessens competition and has an impact 
on the consumers. Example of such conduct is found in Commercial Solvents Corporation v. 
Commission of EC.98  
                   d) Tying arrangements are explicitely forbidden by article 86(d). Tying enables the 
company to extend its first monopoly in the market for the "tying" product into a second market 
for the "tied" product. This practice makes the supply of one product condition to conclude the 
contract for buying other commodity. Such exclusionary conduct is bad for competitive market 
structure, because it lessens competition through foreclosing sale's opportunities and distorts 
choice of the consumers. Apparently, tying arrangements can be used as a method to drive other 
competitors out of the market. 
                   The Court usually looks at product's construction and durability to estimate if such 
arrangement was unlawful. The applicable test is the one of the usage of the product. This means 
that such arrangement is justified only if the tying product can not operate without the tied one. 
Other justification of this practice is to be found in Re Hilti AG v. Commission99, where a unique 
product was protected by copyright and patent and could only be supplied by the dominant firm. 
Yet, in the arrangement there was nothing to forbid, that the second product that was needed and 
unprotected article to be obtained from other suppliers. Therefore, it did not preclude 
possibilities of other rivals and consumers to buy and sale. If the Court finds that the obligation 
from the tying arrangement is only supplementary and that there is no real connection between 
tied and tying product, then this practice will be unlawful and will fall within article 86.  
                    e) Predatory pricing is the converse of excessive pricing. The essence is that an 
undertaking with financial strength, sets its prices at low level in certain markets for limited 
period of time. It reduces its prices, not only because of the low costs, but also with purpose to 
 
98Cases 6 and 7/73 1 CMLR 309 ( 1974 ). 
99Re HILTI AG (1985) 3 CMLR 619. 
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draw other competitors out from the market. The Commission is aware that predatory pricing has 
a bad consequence on the EC market. In its study on predatory pricing100 the Commission 
explicitely stated that in the case when such conduct is practiced, there is no room for normal 
competition. The entrant drops prices that will attract other company's customers and thus force 
those other competitors to charge lower prices and eventually either to absorb the loss or exit the 
market. This conduct is not only bad for the competitive structure of the market, but for ultimate 
users as well. Although in the short run they will benefit from this "price war", they will lose in 
the long run. The reason is that when undertaking obtains monopoly position, it will be able to 
charge an excessive price to its buyers. The Commission in its report identified the multinational 
companies as the most common aggressors, because they are able to cover their losses 
somewhere else. It also found that predatory pricing reduced the present value of the entrant's 
future profit below its fixed entry costs,  so it should not be able to survive for a long time. That 
is why the company usually charges higher price in the market with no other competitors and 
lower price in the market with more lively competition.  
                    To estimate whether such low prices are lawful, the Court usually uses the concept of 
marginal or average variable costs. The existence of a predatory intent is also important for the 
judicial review of such cases. Example of predatory pricing is provided in AKZO case 101. 
                    All these kinds of conducts could not only lessen competition but could also isolate 
national markets. Prevention of such effect is the most important goal of the EC competition law. 
Some of the conducts are exploitative, such as imposing unfair prices and limiting the 
production. They occur where a dominant position has been used to injure those with whom the 
company has trading relations, even if they do not affect other competitors on the market. Others 
are coercive, for example discrimination among the customers that results in unfair treatment for 
some buyers. The reason for such conducts is not to extract more profit from the buyers, but to 
 
10016th Report on Competition policy,1986. 
101case C-62 /86 ,1991 ECR , july 3 1991. 
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obtain some other advantages, such as loyalty from the most important customer. Both kinds of 
conduct are forbidden under article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. The previous discussion examined 
the tests used by the Court in determining antimonopoly cases. In the following section it will be 
presented how the Court analyzes and applies those tests in particular cases.  
 
       8.9. Case studies 
 
                      This section includes the summary of the most important cases decided by the EC 
courts102. It is focused on how the courts interpreted and implemented article 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome. In order to solve the monopoly case the Court first determines relevant product and 
geographic market. 
                       An example of how the Court of Justice determined the product market is in the case 
United Brands Company and United Brands Continental B.V. v. Commission of the 
European Community.103 The Court estimated the relevant product market by using the 
concept of the interchangeability. The particular characteristics of bananas were considered and 
the degrees of substitutability with other fruits especially peak periods, price movements, etc. 
The Court measured the responsiveness of the sales of other kinds of fruit to price changes of 
bananas. It also examined another feature of product market, e.g. supply elasticity, a concept 
connected with examination of the product facilities and the position of other producers of the 
product. The Court looked at the combination of several factors such as structure of other 
competitors and the existence of barriers to entry to demarcate boundaries of the product market. 
                        The relevant test to estimate product market, used by the Court in Hoffman La Roche & 
Co. v. Commission104 ,was the same as in the UBC case, the sufficient degree of 
 
102The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
103United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental B.V. v. EC Commission case 27/76, Court of Justice of EC (`1978) 
E.C.R. 207 . 
10485/76 ,1979 ECR 461. 
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interchangeability between all the products. The Court examined whether all the considered 
products together are forming the same market in respect of their particular use. Then it looked 
at the supply substitutes and found an existence of a highly developed Hoffman La Roche's sales 
network, an absence of significant competition indicated, and no relevant substitutes on the 
market for the products in question. In its analysis of supply elasticity the Court especially 
focused on large capital requirements and a need for long term programming capacities and 
concluded that they constituted barriers to entry for potential competitors. According to those 
analyses the Court defined the product market. 
                      In Institutio Chemocoterapico Italiano Spa and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. 
Commission 105 the Court looked at the supply elasticity  to estimate the relevant product market 
and found that CSC106 was the biggest undertaking which produced aminobutanol. With its 
decision, the Court put limits on the doctrine of the supply substitution that was used in previous 
cases. It examined the supply substitutability and held that, when the substitute was produced by 
bigger expense and risk, it could not be considered as a valid alternative.           
                       In the Michelin 107case likewise in the previous cases, the Court looked at supply 
substitutability i. e. at differences in the plant and equipment needed for production of different 
kinds of car tyres . By using this test, the Court reached the conclusion that there were significant 
differences in the production of tyres for heavy vehicles from the tyres for cars, and defined the 
relevant product market as the one of busses, trucks and other heavy vehicles. Further 
investigations showed that customers had a high preference for Michelin tyres, which acted as a 
kind of barrier for other producers to enter the market. This fact made the elasticity of supply 
lower.  
                   UBC and Suiker Unie's decisions promote the Court's criterion for the geographic 
market. In the first case, the Court defined the relevant market as: " an area where the objective 
 
105Cases 6 and 7/73 1 CMLR 309 ( 1974 ). 
106In the rest of analisis of this case the company will be mentioned as SCS. 
107OJ 1981 L 353/33-67. 
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conditions of competition applying to the conduct in question must be the same for all traders ." 
It looked at custom duties, transportation costs and price target to identify the specific territory. 
The Court concluded that lack of transport facilities or high transportation costs in relation to 
value of the product promoted isolation of national market. Besides this, the Court looked at the 
U.K., France and Italy's preferential system for the African countries and found that such system 
was relevant for its analysis because it created different conditions for competition, so the Court 
excluded markets of those three countries from the definition of the relevant geographic market. 
                  In the second case, the Court examined the transport and storage facilities of all available 
producers of sugar. According to the facts that sugar from other competitors was only available 
in distant areas, that the buyers did not have good storage facilities, and that they needed the 
regular deliveries, the Court defined the relevant geographic market very narrowly. Considering 
the selling area of the Suiker Unie as an indication of the size of the market , the Court found 
southern Germany to be the relevant market , because this company concentrated there the most 
of its sales.  
                       After determining the relevant product and geographic market , the Court turns to the 
question of dominant position. For example, in the UBC's judgment the dominance is defined as:  
          "The position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to 
have an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately its 
consumers." 
            The Court used the company's market share of the already defined market , to estimate the 
dominance of the alleged company . It underlined the importance of the market share saying that: 
" A trader can only be in the dominant position on the market for a product if he has succeeded 
in wining a large part of this market."108 The fact that UBC had only 40% of the relevant market 
shows that the Court recognized that the market share was not the sole indicator of the 
 
108(1979) .E.C.R. p.282. 
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dominance. Beside the market shares of the other participants, the Court also took into 
consideration UBC's structure, the privileged access to supply and according to that, the Court 
found that UBC had effectively occupied the market. The decision of this case is important for 
companies with smaller market share but only when other competitors are insignificant. 
                       In AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission109 the Court also suggested that the market share 
was not a sufficient condition for dominance. It found that AKZO's market share on the 
Community market was 46%-50%, while its competitor ECS held only 1% of the market. 
According to those analyses the Court stated that "AKZO may not have an overwhelmingly large 
market share in quantitative terms, but it does have the economic power to exercise a significant 
impact on the market including the ability both to determine price levels and to eliminate a 
smaller competitor." 
                       In the Michelin case the Court ranged Michelin's market share between 57 % and 65%, 
but when its market share was compered to the market shares of its competitors, the Court 
concluded that even 57% were a sufficient evidence of a dominant position.  
                       Opposite to the previous cases, Hoffman La Roche110 was found to be the largest 
manufacturer on the common market with following market shares: A : 47%, B2 : 86%, B3 : 
64%, B4 : 95% , C : 68%, E : 70% and H : 95%. Other competitors were also considered but 
they were described as insignificant. According to the Court " a situation where an undertaking 
holds a large market share, while its competitors have appreciably smaller shares, can be seen as 
an indication of a dominant position." The Court's opinion further clarified that a substantial 
market share as evidence of the existence of the dominant position was not a constant factor and 
its importance varied from market to market. Not only that the Court used market share of the 
alleged dominant company as relevant test, but it also examined market shares of other 
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participants, financial resources, access to distributors etc., to estimate the dominance on the 
relevant market.  
                    After establishing that dominance on the relevant market, the Court examines whether the 
alleged violator abused such dominant position. The concept of the abuse was laid down in 
Hoffman La Roche's judgment:  
            "The concept of the abuse is an objective concept which relates to the behavior of an 
undertaking in the dominant position which influences the structure of the market where 
as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition 
is weakened". 
            The essence of such a concept consists of attaining advantages which could not be otherwise 
obtained under the conditions of effective competition. In the Michelin case 111, article 86 was 
interpreted as a law that covers practices of dominant undertakings, which were likely to affect 
the structure of the market. The Court in its analysis focused on the methods used by the 
undertaking in question, which hindered the maintenance or development of the level of 
competition and resulted with weakening of the rivalry. Examples of such practices were 
examined by the Court in AKZO, British Leyland, Suiker Unie, UBC , Hoffman La Roche, 
Michelin and CSC cases. 
                       AKZO112 was a multinational Dutch corporation producing organic peroxides. ECS was a 
small firm from U.K. producing the same product. ECS, with its aggressive active selling policy 
took over some of AKZO's customers, first in the U.K and then in Germany. AKZO's officials 
then threatened the ECS that they would start selling below the actual costs if ECS did not stop 
taking over its customers . ECS ignored this threat. As a response, AKZO adopted a tactic of 
pricing below the costs in order to drive ECS out of business. The Court applied the average 
variable costs test to see if the AKZO's conduct amounted to an abuse. It considered prices 
 
111NV Nederlandshe Banden - Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81, 1983 ECR 3461. 
112case C-62 /86 ,1991 ECR , july 3 1991. 
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below average variable costs to be an unlawful price competition. Although AKZO 's conduct 
did not have a larger impact on ECS's profits, the Court concluded that companies which may be 
as efficient as the dominant undertaking but with lower financial capacity are incapable of 
resisting this kind of competition. In addition, the Court put most weight on AKZO's intent to 
eliminate its competitor: 
              "A dominant undertaking has indeed no interest to practice such prices other than to 
eliminate competitors in order to increase its prices by benefiting from its monopoly 
position, since each sale entails a loss."  
            Apparently, most important for the Court's judgment was clear predatory intent and protection of 
smaller company which was consistent with Treaty objectives. This decision of the European 
Court of Justice was criticized, because it did not provide good criteria for estimating real costs 
and it was not clear by how much the sales were below the costs. The possible reason for such 
Court's decision is the promotion of the EC competition policy for a unified single market with 
lots of competitors and equality of opportunities. Besides predatory pricing, AKZO was also 
engaged in price discrimination, for charging lower prices only to ECS's customers and changing 
its prices 60% higher to its own loyal buyers. It imposed its prices not according to its own costs, 
but with a purpose to attract ECS's customers. 
                      British Leyland113 was fined by the Commission for discriminatory pricing. This 
company was granted by the U.K. the exclusive right to determine which cars that it imported 
confirmed with U.K. national standards and the right to issue confirmatory certificates. British 
Leyland arbitrarily used this right and charged different fees according to the kind of the car, i.e. 
left or right hand drive. This measure infringed the principle of free movement of goods, 
hindered competition by creating barriers to entry, and isolated U.K.market. On the appeal, the 
European Court of Justice114 found that the charged fees of 150 or 100 pounds were 
 
113OJ 1984, L 207 / 11. 
114Cas 226 / 84, 1986 ECR 3263. 
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disproportionate to the economic value of a simple administrative check, since B.L.'s price for 
right-hand drive vehicles was only 25 pounds. For the substantially same service, British 
Leyland thus charged different prices. This conduct provides an example of discriminatory 
pricing based on nationality. Since the only country in Europe in which cars drive on the right 
side is U.K., then it is the only market for right-hand drive cars. In this case, the effect of the 
B.L. 's conduct was to promote cars exclusively made for the U.K. market and to impose unfair 
and arbitrary terms on other car manufacturers. This was a way of protecting the U.K. market by 
giving advantages to right-hand drive cars.  
                       UBC case provides an additional example of abusive pricing practice which can create 
barriers to free movements of goods and isolate national markets. UBC was alleged to violate 
article 86, because of its price discrimination practice. It imposed a "selling price which differed 
according to the member state where its customers were established". Actually, UBC did not 
charge according to supply and demand, but according to the conditions of competition. When 
there was a significant competition on the market, its prices were lower, otherwise it imposed 
higher prices. The Court examined the conditions and costs of transportation, the weather, 
Government measures etc., and found that such policy of charging different prices was not 
justified. Afterwards, it considered the second claim for imposing unfair prices for sale for 
different groups of countries. It was alleged that UBC imposed an unfair and excessive price in 
relation to the economic value of the product supplied. The relevant issues were whether the 
difference between the costs actually incurred and the prices actually charged was excessive and 
whether the imposed price was either unfair in itself or when compared to the competing 
product. The Court undertook the analysis of cost margin and looked at the profit figures, that 
showed that UBC had been working with a loss in the market with lower prices and that it had 
not earned profits for five years. According to those facts the Court concluded that the 
Commission did not ascertain adequate legal proof that UBC directly imposed unfair prices.  
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                      Suiker Unie UA v. Commission115 revealed an abusive rebate as kind of price 
discrimination. The Court of Justice found that Suiker Unie abused its dominant position in the 
production of sugar by forming a system of rebates granted in respect of exclusive supplies. With 
such system of rebates Suiker Unie wanted to maintain dominance and somehow to tie its 
customers. The cause for Suiker Unie to practice the conduct was that the producers of sugar 
outside the territory in which the applicant enjoyed dominant position charged much lower 
prices. Consequently, the Suiker Unie calculated a system of reduction in order to neutralize 
benefits from import and for the customers to be more expensive to buy foreign sugar. Suiker 
Unie further argued that this was a normal price reduction, but the Court concluded that it was a 
loyalty rebate and thus a form of price discrimination. The Court explained that Suiker Unie 
reduced its prices for the largest buyers in order to keep them loyal, while at the same time 
charged excessive prices to its smaller customers. The company was found guilty of an 
infringement of article 86(c) i.e., applying dissimilar conditions for similar transactions, and of 
article 86(d) i.e., with its conduct, Unie UA restricted the opportunities to compete for producers 
from other member states. 
                       A further example of loyalty rebates as a kind of discriminatory pricing is provided in the 
case Hoffman La Roche116. This company was the world's largest manufacturer and seller of 
bulk vitamins. It was accused of infringement of article 86 of the Treaty of Rome because of the 
rebates which were offered to its customers as an incentive to buy all or most of their 
requirements exclusively or in preference from Hoffman La Roche. The European Court of 
Justice concluded that rebates were abusive because they tied distributors and " are designed to 
deprive the purchaser of the possible choice of supply source". It did not accept Hoffmans La 
Roche's normal pricing as a valid defense, because it was employed with a purpose to enable its 
long and quiet life on the relevant market. The Court's reasoning was that it was important for an 
 
115111, 1975,ECR 1663. 
11685/76 , 1979 ECR 461. 
71 
undertaking with a huge market share to make sure not to charge prices which are too high, 
because this would make it less competitive. Therefore, Hoffman's conduct amounted to an 
abuse because such fidelity rebates lead to discrimination prohibited under article 86(c)117. This 
kind of price reduction, imposed unfair terms on the customers, thus limited their choice and 
interfered with competition, which affected trade between member states. Dominant company 
must not only refrain from imposing loyalty rebates, but it must also assure that all discounts 
granted to the buyers are not anticompetitive. The difference is that rebate is granted when 
repayment is made at the end of the period over which the amount is calculated and a discount is 
a deduction made when charging a customer, often proportional to the total bill118. However, 
sometimes they are not justified because of their anticompetitive effect, that is, to make more 
difficult for smaller firms to compete. 
                      An example of abusive discount is provided in Michelin119 case. Michelin was found 
guilty of infringing article 86 (a) 120, because the discount system based on the achievement of 
sales target resulted with tying dealers to Micheling who was a dominant supplier. This abuse 
constituted in giving target bonuses to the dealers. Nevertheless, they were not informed of the 
actual level of reduction which varied from case to case. Consequently, the dealers were tied into 
the Michelin's system by uncertainty. Their right freely to deal with other competitors was 
suppressed. 
            The Court said that these discounts could be justified only if there was a clear relationship 
between the level of reduction and benefit obtained by supplier. Michelin could grant such 
discounts only if there was a probable cost saving in planing production or otherwise if it would 
encourage efficiency. But, it did not concern the Michelin case. The lack of transparency of the 
 
117 Treaty of Rome , article 86 (c) " Applying dissimilar conditions to equiualent transactions with other trading parties , 
thereby placing them at a compatitive disadvantage. " . 
118Korah V. E.E.C. COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE ; 1986 p 153. 
119OJ 1981, L 353 / 33 - 67. 
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discount system and the existence of a whole network of Michelin representatives as its dealers 
produced anticompetitive effects . Actually, it hindered competition and made it more difficult 
for other producers to expand their market shares.                 
                      Refusal to deal practiced by the dominant undertaking is an example of coercive practice, 
that is not listed in article 86 (a-d). UBC was the biggest producer of bananas in the world with 
its own chain of distributors. It was charged with the refusal to supply. Its standing customer 
Olsen wanted UBC to give him a preferential treatment. In return, he would undertake an 
obligation not to sell or support any other banana producer. When UBC refused to grant the 
preferences, Olsen started to promote other brands of banana at the expense of UBC's Chiqity 
brand. In response to Olsen's marketing policy, UBC refused to deal with it. UBC explained that, 
such refusal was only a defense from the attack of the largest competitor who had been 
promoted, by Olsen's marketing policy. But the Court did not accept such explanation as 
contrary to the principle of proportionality which is the main principle of the EC legal system. It 
explained that "a counter attack is possible, but it threat must be proportionate, so while the 
Court estimates the facts, it must also take into account the economic strength of the 
undertakings confronting each other." According to the Court, the means did not correspond to 
the ends. It also developed the doctrine that "a company cannot stop supplying a long standing 
customer who remains a regular commercial practice if the order placed by that customer is in no 
way out of the ordinary." According to the Court's judgment, Olsen was only using usual selling 
practices. Therefore, the Court found that UBC'c refusal to supply was contrary to the fair trade 
practice and to the goals of the Treaty of Rome.  
                       Another example of refusal to deal is in the case Institutio Chemocoterapico Italiano 
Spa and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission 121. CSC was a corporation having 
a dominant position on the market of aminobutanol. It acquired 51% of the Italian company 
Institutio Chemocoterapico and supplied it with the product in question. Institutio 
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Chemocoterapico resold the raw materials to another Italian company Zoja. CSC got permission 
from the Italian government to manufacture the same products as Zoja, so they became 
competitors. In the meantime, CSC raised its price and therefore Zoja found an alternative source 
of supply and canceled a large order from CSC. However, CSC supplied Zoja's alternative 
source as well and it prohibited reselling of aminobutanol. Consequently, Zoja was forced to ask 
Institutio, which was controlled by CSC, for its supply, but CSC refused to do that despite the 
long term business relationship.  
                       The European Court of Justice developed a doctrine which stated that:   
            " An undertaking in dominant position ... able to control the supply to manufacturers of 
derivations cannot just, because it decided so, start acting in such a way as to eliminate 
their competitors." 
            The Court looked at the possibilities for alternative product supply in order to see if Zoja could 
provide an alternative source. According to the facts, such derivations were not available, except 
with big expense and risk. So, the Court concluded that in that case such source could not be 
seen as a substitute. Furthermore, the Court looked at the possible process of manufacturing 
which would not involve aminobutanol. But it found that such process had not been improved 
yet, so it could not be used in the industry for a reasonable period of time. The Court did not take 
into consideration whether Zoja had an urgent need for aminobutionol or whether it still had 
large quantities on hand, since it considered these facts irrelevant to the case. The Court's 
decision was that CSC was a dominant supplier with a full control over the resource and that 
there was no other possibility for Zoja but to provide the supply from CSC. In conclusion, CSC's 
conduct was injurious to competition, so the Court considered as proper remedies a fine and an 
order CSC to deal with Zoja.  
 
      8.10. Conclusion       
 
74 
                       The legal analyses introduced in this section show that article 86 is mostly concerned with 
the maintenance of conditions of free competition. The principle of free competition is mostly 
significant for achievement and preservation of a single market122. To accomplish such goal, EC 
created an effective competition system, including the system of protection from monopolistic 
enterprises. Besides the substantial law123, EC developed procedural rules124 and an 
administrative agency in charge for enforcement of antimonopoly law. A judicial review is 
available in the European Court of Justice and in the Court of First Instance. The Courts apply a 
two step test to see if there was the abuse of dominant position. First , they look at the dominance 
on the relevant market which is defined as holding a market share bigger then 45% and second, 
they look at the firm's conduct. The courts are mostly concerned with conducts creating barriers 
to entry or injuries to competition. But there is a change towards antimonopoly policy . Because 
of the high rate of present unemployment, EC is now more concerned with efficiency. There is a 
developing trend towards stringent conditions for application of article 86 and for lowering the 
fines imposed in monopoly cases, because usually the most efficient firms on the market are 
cought by antimonopoly law. Moreover, because of the vigorous rivalry coming from American 
and Japanes firms, some joint ventures which were prohibited in the past, are now allowed, if 
they help them to be more competitive worldwide. At the end, I should mention the importance 
of these rules for their subjects, enterprises. These articles should not be ignored by firms while 
drafting a contract or planning production and marketing policy, because they might be punished 
with fines up to 10% of their turnover for the previous year or they might even have their 
contract declared void 125.Case law supports these statements.  
                      The following chapter is based on the legal analysis of the U.S. and EC antimonopoly 
systems made in the earlier parts and on an actual comparison between them. More precisely, it 
 
122 There is still no absolutly unified European market, for eg: labor mobility is limited and there are language barriers. 
123Article 86 , Treaty of Rome. 
124Regulation 17/62. 
125Korah E. E. C. competition law and practice. 
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9.COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S AND EC ANTIMONOPOLY REGULATION 
                
                       This comparison is made according to the examination of the antimonopoly systems of the 
U.S. and EC presented in the previous sections. The conclusion is that both jurisdictions are 
concerned with regulation of monopolistic position on the market. They, both prohibit 
monopolistic behavior on the market. Their public policy toward monopoly is similar and they 
use the same method, i.e. antimonopoly legislation to control this phenomenon. 
                       Further similarities are that their courts apply the tests of interchangeability and 
crosselacticity of demand in order to ascertain the product market. As for estimation of the 
geographic market, the principle measure is the transportation cost. Although in both legal 
systems market share is an indication of dominance, they do not condemn sheer size of the 
enterprise, but rather target the exclusionary conduct. Mutual example of such conducts are 
predatory pricing, refusal to deal, and excessive pricing. 
                       As for the procedural issues, both the U.S. and the EC have administrative organs in 
charge for administering the antimonopoly law. Judicial review is also available on the appeal. In 
both legal systems, there is a dual enforcement on the level of the federation / community and on 
the level of the member states. The common remedy for monopolization cases is the fine, but 
also cease and desist orders are also available if such conduct can result with irreparable harm. 
                      Yet, a distinction between the U.S. and the EC antimonopoly regulations can be made. 
There are several reasons for that. The U.S. is a federation which exists for a very long time and 
which is created in different ways than the EC. The EC was created in 1958 by an international 
treaty. The Treaty of Rome was signed by independent member states which have language and 
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culture differences. The process of economic and political unification is a slow and painful one, 
and has still been going on. It creates an additional problem and influates the EC antimonopoly 
system. In addition, the U.S. Sherman Act was passed in 1890. It is an old statute that cannot 
quite meet the modern need. Therefore the antitrust courts and lawyers face difficulties with its 
application. The EC article 86 is from a more recent time. It is contained in the Treaty of Rome 
passed in 1958, so it was more possible for the legislature to design it according to the actual 
demand. Furthermore, the central elements of the EC antimonopoly system are protection of the 
trading partners, increasing of efficiency and European integration. The U.S. statute, on the 
contrary, was a response of the public that was afraid of concentration and big business. That is 
why Sherman Act, section 2 above all deals with big enterprises that can ruin competitive market 
structure. Obviosly, one can reach a conclusion that although the U.S and the EC have some 
elements in common, differences in history and organization of communities resulted in different 
regulatory approaches to this issue. The principal differences are stated below. First, there are 
basic differences in the wording of articles concerned. While Sherman Act, section 2 explicitly 
forbids monopolization, article 86 of the Treaty of Rome uses the expression "abuse of a 
dominant position". Thus, the EC applies a wider concept that does not require a proof of 
monopoly. Evenmore, article 86 contains a list of prohibited practices. The Sherman Act does 
not embody such enumeration. 
                      Second, an important distinction is that indication of monopolistic position for the U.S. 
Court is 70 % market share or even more belonging to the alleged monopoly. On the other hand, 
for the European Court of Justice 45% market share is enough to conclude that there was a 
dominance on the market. So, the EC concept focuses more on the ability of a dominant 
undertaking to make independent decisions without considering other competitors. 
                      The third difference is concerned with the regulation of exclusionary practices. For 
example  U.S. law encourages low pricing so long as it does not result in monopoly. Contrary to 
it, the EC definition and application of this rule is stricter. As far as excessive prices are 
concerned to determine a fair rate of return, U.S. courts usually use marginal cost analysis. In the 
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EC, on the other hand, there is no general principle to determine excessive rate of return. 
Different approaches can also be noticed in refusal to deal. While U.S. law distinguishes between 
lawful also and unlawful refusal to deal, the EC rule applies whenever a dominant firm refuses to 
supply its longstanding customer.  
                     Intent can be pointed out as a fourth distinction. While in the U.S. general intent is required 
for monopolization cases, it is not a relevant issue with the EC.    
                      The fifth distinction that can be pointed out are remedies which can be imposed. Sherman 
Act, section 2 in its wording provides for fines and criminal penalties for violation of this law. In 
the EC, secondary legislation, i.e. Regulation 17 contains public sanctions. Accordingly, there 
are different kind of remedies that can be imposed. In the U.S., criminal imprisonment up to 
three years is possible in cases initiated by the Justice Department, but there is no similar 
punishment in the EC.  
                     Further difference is concerned with private remedies, i.e. sanctions. Namely, both courts 
deal with the fact how the damage from private parties can be obtained. In the US they can be 
obtained in district courts. In the EC, however, they are only available in the member state's 
courts and according to national legislation. Obtainable damages differ from state to state. As it 
is already underlined, the reason for such distinction in remedies is again in the character and 
organization of the two communities. 
                      From the previous discussion it is clear that U.S. and EC laws have similarities and 
differences in their antimonopoly regulations. After examining the U.S. and the EC 
antimonopoly systems and comparison between them, the following part of this study will focus 
on situation and legislation in Macedonia . After examination of all relevant issues in the next 










8. REGULATION OF MONOPOLIES IN MACEDONIA 
 
      10.1. General overview 
        
                      The Former Jugoslavian Republic of Macedonia is a small country. It has 2.033.964 
people living in a territory of 25.713 Km.126 It used to be one of the six republics that made up 
the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. When this country started to disintegrate the 
Macedonian people were afraid to become involved in an armed conflict and decided that it 
would be much better to be independent than to take part in a war that was not their own. Now, 
this country is a member of the United Nations and has been recognized by the EC, the U.S., 
Russia etc. Athough Macedonia has succeeded in becoming part of the family of all countries in 
the world, there are still many problems that need to be solved. For example: the process of 
reform of the system and transition towards democracy and market economy is not an easy one. 
Reform in Macedonia is especially hindered by the ongoing war on the Balkan peninsula and the 
embargo imposed on our southern border of Greece.127 Meanwhile, the embargo on our northern 
border has been partially lifted by the United Nations, but only after Macedonia had suffered 
considerable damages. All these economic hardships and pressures have repercussions on our 
production, economy and the number of unemployed persons. Although there are many new 
private firms, they are mainly involved with trade, not with production. It is hard to carry out 
product activities in the conditions of embargo and legal uncertainty. Closed borders and the 
 
126Statistical yearbook of Macedonia ,1991. 
127The effect of this embargo is to prevent Macedonians from traveling to Creece , from importing Greece products and from 
using Thessaloniki's port . 
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civil war in Bosnia make very hard for Macedonian firms to get the raw materials from abroad. 
In addition, most of the producers have lost the foreign markets and they do not have where to 
sell. As far as import is concerned, since 1994 it has been liberalized in the respect of tariffs and 
legal regime. However, the companies must pay the duty rate, the special tax and the tax duty 
which are special percentage from the value of the imported goods. The duty regime depends on 
the kind of imported goods. There is a special protective legislature for some types of industry 
which are important for Macedonia such are agriculture and chemical industry. Prohibitive 
measures employed by the government are specially estimated quotas of the product which are 
allowed to be imported or it imposes special taxis. But, there are also other kinds of quotas that 
are helpful for the firms and which allow row materials imports to be free from paying a duty. 
Yet, it is much cheaper to buy abroad and then resell in Macedonia, instead to produce. In 
addition, government with purpose to stimulate exports, made them free of duty.128  
                       As far as monopoly is concerned, it is hard to speak about monopolistic firms in industry 
nowadays. Even the largest firms are not earning much money because of the already mentioned 
hardships in our economy. Such conclusion is illustrated in the statistical data presented below 
that show present situation for the most concentrated industries with only one producer in 
1993129  
               
 
 
            Industry                      Gross Income                         Gain                 No. of Workers                                          
                                   ( in  thousands of denars)   (in thousands of denars) 
1. Steel                                2.400                               45                                112 
2. Ferro Alloy                     186.400                          6.130                             3.468 
 
128Sluzben vesnik na R. Makedonija, Zakon za Carina; 1984.                                                                                                                                      
129Zavrsni smetki vo stopanstvoto na R. Makedonia , Zavod za platen promet na R. Makedonia,1993. 
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3. Copper                           79.400                            2.491                             841  
4. Zinc                               155.000                          11.852                            2.203 
5. Other Colored               145.000                               .                                 923 
                        metals                        
6. Gypsum                            7.600                               389                             350  
7. Cement                           131.400                            164.693                      1.208 
8. Synthetics                          300                                   137                             90 
            Theard 
9. Tyros For                         3.300                                1.101                           30 
                        vehicles 
10. Cacao                             77.400                              26.549                          657 
11. Plant oil                           56.000                              20.861                          564 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Total of most  
concentrated branches               9.439.00                            234.245                         12.851                         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
The industry as a whole             7.758.800                         1.019.082                      180.457 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Participation in %  
of the most concentranted brunches in 
 the whole industry                       0,08 %                             0,04 %                           0,14 % 
               
 
                      These figures show that as far as production is concerned, only in few industrial branches 
there is a monopolistic structure of the market with the sole producer. In terms of gross income, 
profit and unemployment of the monopolist's share of the entire industry is insignificant. Profits 
are not attractive for other firms to enter the market, plus huge capital requirements which 
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impose barrier to entry. Perhaps, these figures only show the depression in which our economy is 
now. Macedonian economy needs cash flows and new investments, but the problem is where to 
get them. 
                    Considering the current economic situation in Macedonia, it must be considered whether 
Macedonia needs to regulate monopolies, and if so, how to do it. But first, the legal framework 
in Macedonia will be examined. 
  
      10.2. Prior legislation concerning monopoly 
 
                     Macedonia used to be a part of the Socialistic Federate Republic of Yugoslavia. SFRY 
recognized the importance of market economy. It was the only "socialistic" country with some 
kind of free market. Thus, the federal constitution from 1964 gave some independence to 
enterprises. The relevant statutes governing this matter were: 
            1.Basic law for companies 
            2. Basic law for business dealings on the market ,1962 
            3. Basic law for trade of goods and services abroad, 1962 
            4. Resolution on the process of concluding the agreements between market subjects, for 
cooperation in international trade, 1964 as amended in 1970 
            5. Statute for trade of goods, 1966 
            6. Basic law for trade of goods, 1967. Article 5 of this law provides for doing business 
according to bona fides130 and the principles of fair competition. Article 6 prohibits 
limitation of freedom of competition imposed by other subjects on the market. 
            7. Act for restrain of unfair competition and monopolistic agreements, 1974  
                      The new constitution from 1974 laid down the contours of the changed economic system 




They were independent subjects which were not owned by the state. Nevertheless, the 
government planed the country's economy, the production, types of products, prices etc. It could 
also impose temporary measures according to its plans. The government, even used to have 
representatives in the bodies for electing managers of the companies. Such situation was 
sustained until the enactment of the new Company Act in 1989, which allowed market subjects 
to act freely on the market. 
                      This was the market environment in Yugoslavia, when the Act for restraint of unfair 
competition and monopolistic agreements ( hereinafter the 1974 Act) was passed. It was an effort 
to preserve good behavior on the market. This federal law was created to protect a single 
Yugoslavian market. It was drafted according to western models . In Macedonia this law was 
never applied in an actual case.                                                                             
                      Article 1 of the 1974 Act defined its scope. It prohibited activities whose purpose was 
creation and abuse of monopolistic position on the single Yugoslavian market and proscribed 
measures that should be taken for protection of the market from such activities. In addition, 
article 3a contains a general clause that prohibited "activities that enable material or other 
advantages based on unequal position in bargaining, using these activities in a manner which is 
against good will and business moral." On the other hand chapter IIIa, article 12a (1-5) contained 
a specific clause, which enumerated activities considered to be "activities for creation and abuse 
of monopolistic position." The wording of the article indicated that it had been a nonexhaustive 
list. 
             Limitation of output by refusing to deliver needed quantity, in order to increase prices 
was specially forbidden by Article 12a (1). 
            Article 12a (2) clearly prohibited using monopolistic position in a manner which was 
against good trade customs. It was forbidden for a firm that was the only producer or 
supplier in one territory to apply different terms for equal transactions. 
            Article 12a (3) was concerned with monopson. It prohibited a sole buyer on the market to 
use its position and to obtain unlawful advantages. 
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           Article 12a (4) banned producers to sell their goods to ultimate users only in the seat of 
their organization in order to achieve a higher price and better position on the market. In 
such case, they limited the market, because ultimate users could obtain goods only from 
them. Consequently, the dominant company would maintain the monopolistic position on 
the market as a sole seller and thus, be able to charge higher prices.  
            From article 12a (5) we can see that this act was indirectly concerned with protection of 
the consumers, because it outlawed: " activities that prohibit the sale of goods or 
performance of services that are charged with lower prices than prices provided in 
directives." Directives were governmental acts that regulated prices. They usually kept 
them low and it was forbidden for companies to charge higher prices than those estimated 
by the government. But, this article was even more concerned with the obedience of the 
enterprises to the governmental directives. 
                      The 1974 Act the same as article 86 and Sherman Act, section 2 prohibited the abuse of 
monopolistic position, not the market dominance itself. It is obvious that article 12a(1)-(2) 
prohibited conduct similar to one prohibited in western countries. Nevertheless, article 12a (4-5) 
showed the socialistic background of the country. It indicated that market had been strongly 
regulated by the governmental acts i.e., directives. Prices were not formed freely on the market, 
but were imposed by the government. The government also limited the freedom of companies 
i.e., which companies they would make business with and how. 
                      As far as procedural issues were concerned the enforcement agency was very vaguely 
explained. There was no special competition administrative organ. Namely the Trade Inspection 
was in charge of supervising the administration of this statute. However, the main accent was put 
on the private enforcement as the most effective. Civil procedure could be commenced in the 
courts by persons who had suffered damages (article 14). Private persons could obtain an 
injunction to stop the unlawful conduct and damages. The damage procedure was the same as the 
procedure governing cases of tort. In addition, public sanctions were injunction (25a) and 
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imposition of fines (article 24). The alleged violator could apply to the courts in respect of the 
decisions of the Trade Inspector. 
                      The 1974 Act was a progressive one in its time and showed SFRY's determination to 
achieve a market economy. But it was not an effective one and has was never really enforced.  
         
      10.3. Present legislation 
 
10.3.1. Substantive law 
                        The present law aimed at regulating monopolistic activities is the Trade Act131 enacted in 
1990. It replaced the 1974 Act. The Trade Act was passed as a federal law, before the country 
fell apart. It reflected the democratic changes in the SFRY. In Macedonia, the 1990 Trade Act is 
still in use, since the new Macedonian legislation is in the drafting stage. 
                      The 1990 Trade Act is not a special law regulating competition and monopoly, but rather 
contains a "Monopoly Clause" in chapter IV. In chapter IV article 21 defines the term 
"monopolistic activities". It states that the term "monopolistic activities" includes both 
monopolistic agreements and behavior. Thus, both conducts and agreements are condemned. 
Namely, in this act the term "monopoly" does not refer only to unilateral conduct by one 
monopolistic enterprise (like in the western countries), but it also embraces contracts and 
conspiracy between two or more firms having a dominant position on the market with the 
unlawful purpose to gain some kind of advantage. However, in this study I focused on the 
monopolistic behavior which does not require any contract or conspiracy. Only this aspect of the 
Trade Act is going to be further examined. 
                       Article 21, (3) determines the term "monopolistic behavior" as "abuse of the dominant 
position on the market and attempts to monopolize and abuse of the monopolistic position." 
 
131Trade act , August 10, 1990 no. 46 :1349-1351.  
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Thus, this act separates abuse of the dominant position from the abuse of the monopolistic 
position and defines them as two different offenses .  
                       Articles 24 and 25 of the Trade Act are regulating the abuse of the dominant position. 
Article 24 defines dominant position as a position of a company which holds more than 40 % of 
the relevant market. Article 25 of the Trade Act in general condemns abuse of the dominant 
position and especially "refusal to sell or buy goods with a purpose to gain material advantage, 
which is contrary to good customs."  
                      Article 26 is related to actual monopolization and attempts to monopolize. It contains a 
nonexhaustive list as article 86 of the Treaty of Rome does. For example, " to use this advantage 
in order to increase the expenses from import or trade and to gain material advantage". The ratio 
is that a monopoly may artificially increase its expenses in order to charge higher prices, 
especially when prices are determined by the governmental body. The monopolistic company 
can justify its higher prices by showing the list of its expenditure. The purpose of this article is to 
protect the consumers from overcharge.  
                       After the analysis of 1990 Trade Act, my further study will compare it first with the article 
86 of the Treaty of Rome and second with the Sherman Act, section 2. It is obvious that 
legislators used article 86 of the Treaty of Rome as a model to regulate dominant position on the 
market. This conclusion is first based on the fact that both Macedonian and the EC jurisdictions 
defined the dominance on the market in the same way. Only in the EC it is determined by the 
case law and in Macedonia is defined by the Trade Act. The second similarity is that both of 
them are regulating market position of firms which do not have very big market share. Third, 
Macedonia, as well as the EC does not prohibit dominance itself , but rather the conduct. The 
fourth parallelism is that the specific clause contained in article 25 of the Trade Act which 
expressly prohibits limiting the output in order to increase prices, is similar to the article 86 (b) 
of the Treaty of Rome which prohibits limiting the output on the prejudice of the consumers.    
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                       On the other hand, there is also a similarity in the wording between article 26 of the Trade 
Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize and Sherman Act section 2, 
which also forbids monopolization and attempts to monopolize. 
                      Article 26 does not clearly state, but presumably it is concerned with a pure monopoly or 
with a company having at least an 80% market share. The assumption is based first on the fact 
that the Trade Act already contains articles (24 & 25) which concerns the firms with a smaller 
market share and second based on the expression that is used in article 26, i.e., monopoly which 
is usually related to a company having more than 80% market share. However, here the 
similarities end, because article 26 in its first part defines the term monopolization as a "firm's 
activity with a purpose to obtain material advantage, based on an unequal position and contra fair 
trade practice." Sherman Act, section 2 does not define the term monopolization or attempt to 
monopolize. Further difference between them is that in its second part, article 26(1-2) of the 
Trade Act examples of monopolization are enumerated. Sherman Act, section 2 does not give 
examples of prohibited practices.  
                       As far as Trade Act itself is concerned, my opinion is that articles 24 to 26 of the Trade 
Act regulate the same matter and they are redundant. If the legislature wants to regulate not only 
monopolistic enterprises but also companies with a smaller market share, it only needs only to 
rely on the concept "abuse of the dominant position" and then give the examples of prohibited 
activities. Both articles regulate the same activity on the same way. For example, articles 25 
prohibits conduct of a firm in a dominant position, which means that the firm is in a better 
position from the other business parties. Article 26 prohibits monopoly activities based on better 
market position. However, the article forbidding the abuse of the dominant position can also 
refer to a monopoly, because article 24 defines dominant position as a firm having more than a 
40% market share. Further on, article 25 specifies that it is mostly concerned with limiting the 
output in order to increase the prices. This conduct can also be practiced by the monopoly which 
is even in a better position to employ such activity. The second part of article 26 is concerned 
with artificial increase of expenses. Such conduct can also be practiced by a firm with a smaller 
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market share than 85 %. Therefore, these articles do not only seem to be redundant, but also 
confusing. There is no need for two articles. Article 25 covers monopoly conduct as well. 
Perhaps the legislature was only trying to make the statute clearer. According to my opinion, it 
would be much easier only to modificate article 25. First, it can contain the general clause 
prohibiting any activity of a dominant firm based on an unequal market position which is 
practiced with a purpose to obtain material advantage and the second specific part can contain 
the nonexhaustive list of examples of abuses. 
               
10.3.2. Procedural rules 
             
                       Beside the relevant articles of the substantive law, the 1990 Trade Act also contains 
procedural rules. Article 27 of this Act for the first time creates a special enforcement 
administrative agency. The original name is the " Federal Commission for Protection from 
Monopolistic Behavior" (hereinafter the "commission"). The field of its activity is " to follow the 
conduct of firms in dominant position and to take protective measures against monopolistic 
behavior." In order to fulfill its task, article 29 of the Trade Act grants the investigation power to 
the Commission which is entitled to request all needed documents from the company under 
investigation. The second part of article 27 states that the Commission can only undertake the 
preventive measures against monopolistic abuse of the market. But, the article does not specify 
which measures. In cases where the Commission finds that abusive conduct already exists, it 
must inform the Federal Trade Inspectorat. This organ is in charge to act with undertaking proper 
measures such as injunction (article 38) against actual abuse. The Federal Trade Inspectorat was 
a federal administrative organ in charge with enforcement with the Federal Trade laws, taking 
care of the single Yugoslavian market. The Trade Act was enacted as a federal law. 
Consequently the enforcement bodies were federal, i.e., the Federal Trade Inspectorat and the 
Federal Commission. However, since Yugoslavia fell apart a short time after passing this law, 
such Commission was probably never established. Although the 1990 Trade Act is still in force 
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in Macedonia, a similar administrative agency on the republic level has never been established. 
Therefore, the Trade Act's Commission remained on the paper as an idea for the future 
enforcement of the antimonopoly law. 
                      The present administrative organ in Macedonia for the enforcement of the Trade Act and 
its Monopoly Clause is the Trade Inspectorat of the Republic. The Trade Inspection Act132 
empowers the Trade Inspectorat of the Republic to administer and supervise the law against 
monopolies. The  last sentence of article 6 states that "the Trade Republic Inspectorat hinders the 
possibility for anybody to obtain advantage on the market by abusing the monopoly position." 
That is why, the Inspectorat can impose fine, which is provided by article 44 (3-4) for the abuse 
of dominant position , monopolization and attempts to monopolize. The Trade Inspectorat is also 
empowered to issue a temporary injunction until the courts reach the decision. The alleged 
violators can apply to the courts. In the administrative the procedure courts reexamine the 
Inspectorat's decision. Furthermore, only the courts in the criminal procedure can sentence the 
responsible person with the imprisonment. Such criminal penalty is provided by article 43, for 
infringement of article 26 (1)-(2). This is an interesting solution, similar to Sherman act, section 
2 which provides for imprisonment up to 3 years. Article 43 provides for imprisonment up to 5 
years133 if a person uses its dominant position to increase the price of imports or to conclude the 
contract with higher price than prices charged in the market place in order to increase expenses 
and thus, to be able to charge higher prices. So, criminal penalties can be obtained only in those 
two cases concerning international trade, which are designed first to protect society's companies 
and second to protect domestic consumers from undue exploitation. 
                      In addition, private action can be commenced by every person that suffered loss from 
monopolistic behavior. Such persons can obtain damages in the civil legal procedure. 
 
132 Sluzben vesnik na SRM , ZAKON ZA PAZARISNA INSPEKCIJA . 
(Trade Inspection Act) , NB. 40 , PAGE 1114 ; 1973. 
133refers to U.S. Sherman Act , section 2. 
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                       "Monopoly Clause" from the Trade Act has never been used in Macedonia and there is no 
case law that would help the interpretation of these articles. Namely, the Trade Act is an 
inheritance from the Yugoslavian law and will be changed soon. It was made for another kind of 
a country, a federation that is already dead and for a different, socialistic system. Therefore, it is 
not suitable for Macedonia. This Act is still in force for practical reasons. Otherwise , without a 
law regulating the trade in the period of the transition, the market and the traders will be in a total 
confusion. Especially considering the fact that the new Macedonian Trade Act is still in a draft. 
The Macedonian legislature has not yet stated a clear position whether it intends to include the 
articles regulating market behavior or competition in the new trade law that is under 
consideration.  
 
10.3.3. Other relevant laws   
             
                       Another law where we can find relevant provisions regulating the monopolistic behavior 
on the market is the Obligation law 134. The part which contains the principles in creation of 
obligations are the Fundamental Provisions of the Obligation law. They prohibit creation and 
abuse of monopolistic position. More precisely, article 14 forbids the use of superior position in 
order to achieve material advantage, which would put the other party in the inferior position. It is 
a kind of protection for the weaker party not to be forced to conclude tie in arrangements. 
                       Moreover, the public policy in Macedonia is concerned with regulation of monopolistic 
behavior on the market. The legal basis for future statutory regulation is to be found in the 
Constitution of Macedonia, the chapter on Economical Relationships, article 55 which states that 
           "The country assures equal legal protection for all subjects on the market. Macedonia 
undertakes measures against monopoly position and conduct on the market." 
 
134Sluzben Vesnik na SFRJ ;nb.29 :1185, 1978. 
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            From the first sentence it is obvious that its main goal is protection of competitors and trading 
partners. The second sentence provides for suppression of monopolistic behavior on the market 
because of its recognized bad consequences. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in near future 





             This table shows relevant laws, enforcement agencies and sanctions for anti monopoly cases in  
            the U.S., the E.C. and in Macedonia.       
             
____________________________________________________________________________________                  
                                                    U.S.                                 EC                            Macedonia 
           
______________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Law             Sherman Antitrust Act                     Treaty of Rome              Trade Act 
                                        section 2                          article 86                   articles 21, 24-26 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
            Governamental         1.Justice department          1.Commission of              1.Trade Inspestion 
            bodies                      2.Federal Trade                    the European 
                                               commission                        Community   
                                            3.State attorney                     D.G. IV 
                                               general 
            ______________________________________________________________________________ 
            Sanstions                  1.Fine                                1.Fine                                     1.Fine 
                                            2.Imprisonment                  2.   /                                        2.Imprisonment  
                                                up to 3 yeras                                                                  up to 5 years 
                                            3.Preliminary/                     3.   /                                        3.Preliminary                                                                                                                                                           
permanent                                                                      injunction 
                                                injunction                            
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                                            4.Cease &                          4.Final cease &                      4.  / 
                                                desists order                       desists order 
                                            5.Damages                         5.Damages                             5.Damages 
                                    in member state  
                                            6.  /                                    6. Periodic penalty                  6.  /  
  -                                         7.  /                                   7.Nullity of                              7.  /                
                                            condemnd practice  
                                            8.Mandatory orders            8.  /                                        8.  /  






             
            1. Reasons for having an antimonopoly law. An important component of the market economy is 
a competition. This rivalry between firms induces development, technical improvements and 
increase of quality. To survive on the market companies try to produce better products and to sell 
them for lower prices. It brings benefits for the competitors, consumers and society as a whole. 
            However, some firms in order to maximize their profit use unfair devices. They try to restrain the 
trade, which damages competition. For example, a dominant firm on the market could restrict its 
output, increase prices and create barriers to entry for potential competitors. Such a firm could 
even employ illegal practices in order to drive its smaller rivals out of the market. The kind of 
behavior opposite to the basic law of supply and demand destroys the normal conditions of 
competition, and places companies in an unequal position . In cases when there is no equal 
opportunity, it is hard for non-dominant firms to survive on the market. All firms should have the 
same possibilities and then compete with their lower costs or superior products. To achieve " 
fairness" on the market place Macedonia needs an effective antimonopoly system, to control 
conduct of dominant firms. 
                       Moreover, Macedonia needs such system in order to realize its commitment not only to 
the market economy, but to democracy as well. The reason is that beside the economic impact 
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dominant, firms can also produce political consequences. For example, accumulated market 
power will enable companies with the biggest market share to achieve political power and they 
will be able to request a beneficial legislation. Suppression of bad political consequences is 
especially needed in this period of transition, because:  
            "Enterprise which is not competitive cannot for a long time remain free, and a community 
which refuses to accept the discipline of competition inevitably exposes itself to the 
discipline of absolute authority.135"  
            Therefore, concentrated economy power can not be tolerated, because giant pressure groups can 
ultimately gain control of the government and our newborn democracy can be superseded by 
some form of authoritarianism. 
                       Although the Macedonian economy and its firms are in very bad position now, that is not 
a sufficient excuse for the absence and ineffectivness of enforcement of competition law. 
Moreover, the protective legislature that will help legal certainty and will establish the basis for 
mutual trust of the trading partners is necessary for the transitional period. Although the most 
successful companies might appeal against legislative initiatives to control their behavior and 
their market power, antimonopoly legislature is a precondition for efficient and free market 
enterprises, promotion of economical growth and bigger discipline among trade subjects, not 
only for Macedonia, but worldwide. 
            2. Macedonia should pass a new law against monopoly according to western models,  
            but modified to our special circumstances. It is clear that public policy requires Macedonia to 
regulate dominant companies on the market. At the begining, the policy goals must be 
determined, for example, building an effective market system, protection of small and medium 
sized firms, increase of competition through new entries on the market, encouragement of new 
investments through improvement of legal certainty, higher employment, economic growth, 
increased efficiency etc.            
 
135 Norver. & Savitt ;Conceptual readings in the marketing economy , 1971. 
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                       Next, the market can not regulate itself by its "invisible hand". That is why, it is important 
to identify tools for achievement of this aim e.i. regulation of the tradeplace. The best legal 
instrument to be engaged in Macedonia is the legislative method for control of market behavior. 
The reason to employ such instrument is that it does not involve governmental interference. So, 
this legal instrument enables some kind of a balance between overcontrol and undercontrol of the 
market. 
                       At the end, it will be necessary to measure the effects of the instrument used. Instead of 
having positive results, the law can be very strict and suppress trade. So, the relation between the 
law and market subjects must be clearly estimated in the present situation. It is of great 
importance new rules and procedures to be drafted in such a manner to function in accordance 
with development of our market and international trade, to enable harmonization with the 
western rules for competition and closer relationships with international trading partners.            
            3. The system for protection of monopolies must satisfy certain basic criteria.  
             First it should be efficient. The procedure should be fast and accurate. Violators should be found 
and fined as speedily as possible. Second, the system should be transparent. All subjects of this 
law should be clearly informed about its content and purpose. Firms must be able to rely on the 
legal framework. Third, a way must be found to reduce the time and expense of such 
burdensome cases. For example: The Rulings of the body in charge must be given within a short 
time to speed up the procedure. Fourth, antimonopoly system should be tailored in such a way as 
to enable effective protection of the competition on the market and of the society interest. Fifth, 
Macedonia needs a separate act dealing with monopolies, instead of the clause in the 1990 Trade 
Act. It should regulate monopolies in the trade and manufacture. This future Act should exempt 
labor and agriculture, which are very sensitive and specific issues to deal with. The new Act 
should contain articles dealing with both substantive and procedural issues. 
            4. Substantive law. A special article that will govern monopoly cases must be drafted in such a 
way as to the be relevant law not only for monopolistic enterprises, but as well for dominant 
companies with much lower share. I believe that abuse of the dominant position should be the 
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main concept. This concept is concerned with companies with smaller market share, and it 
catches their anticompetitive conduct. Another reason which supports use of the concept of the 
abuse of dominant position is that it is accepted by the EC countries. Association agreements 
with former socialistic "Visegrad" countries also contain article 86, which is important for 
harmonization of laws and better communication with the EC. Although there is no individual 
Association agreement yet Macedonia is one of the countries that sees its perspective in the 
European Community. Not only as future member136, but also as trading partner. Our companies 
should become familiar with the idea, meaning and consequences of article 86. This can be better 
achieved by having similar domestic legislation. 
                      Futher on, the article must contain an active prohibition dealing with firm's conduct. 
Therefor the size of the company is not going to be condemned by its virtue, but only the 
unlawful conduct of such dominant firm. 
                      It should separate conduct from agreements and conspiracy and underline that it refers 
only to conducts of dominant firms. This is with a purpose to be more specific and to try not to 
confuse things. Beside such general clause which prohibits abuse of the dominant position, the 
article should contain some examples of most frequent practices. Therefore, the Act should 
provide a list of examples of prohibited practices e.g. limitation of output with purpose to 
increase price of those goods137, unjustified refusal to supply when customer does not have 
another source of supply available, imposing unfair terms in trade in order to gain bigger profit 
and discrimination among customers which places them at competitive disadvantage. All these 
practices enable a dominant firm to discriminate among customers or to create barriers to entry 
with purpose to retain the control over the market and to suppress the competition.  
 
136Which is very far , especialy considering unfriendly atitude of one of its members Greece.  
137Similar to 12a (1) , Law for Suppresion of Unfair Competition and Monopolistic Agreements. 
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                     The antimonopoly Act should also contain a definition of the dominance according to the 
size of the market share held by a company. For example, a dominant firm is a firm having more 
than 50 % market share on the relevant market.    
                     The Act should also provide for articles that will make easier for the courts and involved 
party to define the product and geographic market. For example, the relevant product market is 
the market for products which are interchangeable in the eyes of the customers regarding their 
use, or  the relevant geographic market is the selling area which can be reached by customers 
without having transportation costs. 
                      The new Act must be clear and precise because in Macedonia, court's decisions are not a 
source of law. Thus , the law must be detailed in order to provide guidelines not only for the 
courts , but also for the actors on the market. The new law is going to be essential for a clear and 
detailed interpretation which will help the firms to behave in accordance with the law. Further 
on, such law is needed, because each case is going to be examined in the light of specific 
circumstances. 
            5. The new Macedonian antimonopoly law must provide for effective enforcement mechanisms. 
Its purpose should be to enable interested parties to fulfill their tasks and to protect their legal 
rights. This Act should create a special administrative body to deal with competition matters. It 
should be an independent governmental body that will supervise the administering of this Act. In 
order to be effective, the antimonopoly authority must have the power to investigate, to request 
documents and to exercise all the powers necessary to enable this organ successfully to 
determine the relevant facts. It should be composed of persons who are professionals, equipped 
both with legal and business knowledge. Further on, such authority should be granted power to 
issue preliminary or temporary injunctions in cases where investigated conduct could impose 
irreparable harm to its competitor. If this body finds that there has been a violation it must have 
the power to fashion the remedy, such as imposing fines and to issue an order to stop the 
infringement. On the other hand, the operations of such body should be supervised by some 
higher authority i.e., a higher administrative organ. It could perhaps be the Trade Inspectorat of 
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the Republic which is controlling the work of all other local Inspectorats. The Republic Trade 
Inspectorat, is already empowered by the 1990 Trade Act to act in the case of monopolization 
and perhaps has some experience over this matter. The proceedings of the antimonopoly 
authority should be governed by the general rules of the administrative procedure. According to 
the administrative procedure , judicial review from the Supreme Court of Macedonia is provided 
for the applicants who claim that their right was infringed by the decision of the governmental 
body, so the new Act should give the same right in the monopolization cases.    
                      Finally, it should also be allowed for private parties to start the procedure. They could 
either file a complaint with the antimonopoly authority or ask for damages in the appropriate 
courts according to civil procedure measures. Private plaintiffs must have the right to commence 
the procedure because such right is likely to lead to better detection of the monopoly cases. It is 
in my opinion that all persons who have suffered direct injury from the monopolistic behaviour 
on the market should have a standing.                                                                                                                                              
            6. The system of remedies should be designed to compensate the victims and to prevent or deter 
unlawful practices. According to the experience of the other countries, the Macedonian system 
of remedies should embrace fines, injunction and damages. 
            Administrative organ should be granted with power to impose fines in cases of infringement of 
relevant article. The function of the fine is to punish the violator. However, it can as well prevent 
and deter the unlawful practices. For example ; the companies will be afraid to employ 
prohibited practice if the fines are high. The basis for calculating the fine can be measured by the 
percentage of turnover of relevant company in the previous year138or by some percentage of 
material advantage gained through monopoly device.139 In addition, to ensure integrity of the 
investigation procedure, the antimonopoly authority should have the power to impose fines in 
 
138For example regulation 17 article 15 (2) : 10% of the turnover of the previous year. 
139Para 48: Hungarian law against restarin of trade. 
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cases when companies intentionally or negligently give incorrect information or refuse to 
provide all documents. 
                      The antimonopoly agency should be allowed to issue an injunction to stop the unlawful 
conduct. Private parties should be also allowed to ask for preliminary and temporary injunction 
but, only in cases where they can show that they are going to suffer irreparable harm, because of 
the alleged violator's conduct. The reason to be precautious in issuing preliminary injunction is 
that in such cases it is still not proved that the defendant really violated the law. Therefore, the 
courts must be careful, since the injunction might harm the alleged violator and suppress the 
competition.  
            In addition, to make the private enforcement more successful, injured parties should be entitled 
to a double sum 140of damage suffered. This should work as an incentive for private parties to be 
more active in the enforcement of the act. The basis for computation of damages should be the 
difference paid between monopoly and competition price in the case of overcharge141. When 
competitors are damaged by the conduct of the dominant firm, they should be able to collect 
double the amount of damages calculated. This sanction does not have the sole purpose to 
compensate the victims , but also is designed to have a deterrent effect on dominant firms. Such 
offense is necessary to serve the second goal of the remedies. 
                      I do not think that a penalty with clear criminal nature as an imprisonment is good remedy 
in case of Macedonia. The same deterrent effect can be achieved by levying fines and awarding 
damages. Perhaps this remedy should be available only in cases in which the defendant does not 
have enough money to pay the fine or damages . 
 
140I think that the triple sum available under U.S. law is too high for Macedonia's economic conditions. 
141In U.S. now is adopted test proposed by Turner and Areeda which says that" an injured person is not entitled to have 
damages based on the excess of the monopoly price but only to the price increment reasonably attributable to the 




            8. The fact that it will be difficult to enforce such an antimonopoly law should not prevent 
Macedonia from enacting it, since the benefits will outweigh the burden. The market economy 
does not yet work properly, since the process of reform is still ongoing. Therefore, it is clear that 
under present circumstances in Macedonia, it will be difficult to implement the antimonopoly 
legislation. 
            There are several reasons for that. First, there are not enough money or resources to enforce such 
a law properly. The consequence is that with the given tight budget restraints, it will be hard to 
create the antimonopoly authority. It will be hard to train the personnel and to enable them to 
work their job efficiently. Next difficulty is that our courts are not equipped to deal with this kind 
of issue, since there is no court practice in this field. Lastly, it is unlikely that such a law would 
enjoy support from traders and manufacturers, who would see it as another attack on their 
freedom to deal. 
                      Yet, despite these difficulties, Macedonia should proceed to enact and enforce such 
antimonopoly legislation. As soon as Macedonia has a similar antimonopoly regulation, 
Macedonian businessmen and lawyers will be more familiar with the antimonopoly laws in the 
countries of their trading partners. Beside helping them not to infringe foreign antimonopoly 
legislation in international transactions this knowledge would perhaps help them to strengthen 
their bargaining position e.g., to avoid tying arrangements etc. Therefore, the benefits of having 
will outweigh the disadvantages in the long run, provided that the law is tailored to respond our 
special needs and is properly enforced. Competition as important segment of the market must be 
preserved. Antimonopoly legislation is the best method used from more developed countries that 
had market economy for centuries. The experience of the western countries shows that 
competition is necessary part of healthy market economy. Thus, in order for Macedonia to enter 
into trading relations on an equal footing with its European and other partners, it is necessary to 
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